ANIGLASE YOHANNAN versus RAMLATHA AND ORS.

Citation: [2005] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 440 · Decided: 23-09-2005 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: ARIJIT PASAYAT · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
ANIGLASE YOHANNAN 
v. 
· RAMLATHA AND ORS. 
SEPTEMBER 23, 2005 
[ ARIJIT PASAYA T AND C.K. THAKKER, JJ.] 
Specific Relief Act, 1963-Section J 6(c) rlw Explanation (ii)-Suit for 
specific performance of agreement to sell-Relief-Grant of-Held: Conduct 
C of the plaintiff must be blemishless throughout-On facts, the plaint contained 
essential facts leading to the inference that the plaintiff was always ready 
and willing to perform his part of the contract-Hence, the suit ought to be 
decreed. 
A suit for specific performance of ExtAl, agreement for sale, was filed. 
D The defendant resisted the suit contending that he executed Ext.Al in favour 
of the plaintiff only as security for the amount advanced by the plaintiff to 
him and; further that the plaintiff had executed another agreement (Ext.Bl) 
in favour of the defendant agreeing not to enforce the specific performance of 
the agreement. The Trial Court found that the plaintiff was not the author of 
Ext.Bl and that Ext.Al was not executed as security for repayment of the 
E amount advanced, as contended by the defendant. But, it denied the relief of 
specific performance of the contract on ground that the plaintiff failed to plead 
and prove that he was still ready and willing to perform his part of the contract 
and hence the reqliirements of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 
were not complied with. Instead, the plaintiff was only given a decree for 
F realization of the sum paid as advance with 6% interest p.a. But both Single 
Judge and Full Bench of the High Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to 
a decree in the manner prayed for. Hence the present appeal. 
G 
H 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1.1. The basic principle behind Section 16(c) read with 
Explanation (ii) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is that any person seeking 
benefit of the specific performance of contract must manifest that his conduct 
has been blemishless throughout entitling him to the specific relief. The 
provision imposes a personal bar. If the pleadings manifest that the conduct 
of the plaintiff entitles him to get the relief on perusal of the plaint he should 
440 
ANJGLASE YOHANNAN v. RAMLATHA 
441 
not be denied the relief. Section 16(c) mandates the plaintiff to aver in the A 
plaint and establish as the fact by evidence aliunde that he has always been 
ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. [448-A-C) 
1.2. In the present case, the agreement for sale was executed on 
15.2.1978 and the period during which the sale was to be completed was 
indicated to be six months. Undisputedly, immediately after the expiry of the B 
six months period lawyer's notice was given calling upon the present appellant 
to execute the sale deed. It is also averred in the plaint that the plaintiff met 
the defendant several times and requested him to execute the sale deed. On 
finding inaction in his part, the suit was filed in September, 1978. Para 3 of 
the plaint indicates that the plaintiff was always ready to get the sale deed C 
prepared after paying necessary consideration. In para 4 of the plaint 
reference has been made to the lawyer's notice calling upon the defendant to 
execute the sale deed. In the said paragraph it has also been described as to 
how after the lawyer's notice was issued plaintiff met the defendant. In para 
5 it is averred that defendant is bound to execute the sale deed on receiving 
the balance amount and the plaintiff was entitled to get the document executed D 
by the defendant It is also not in dispute that the balance amount of the agreed 
consideration was deposited in Court simultaneously to the filing of the suit 
When the factual background is considered in light of the principles set out 
above, the inevitable conclusion is that the judgments of the Single Judge 
and the Full Bench of High Court do not suffer from any infirmity to warrant E 
interference. [444-G-H; 445-A-C; 448-D] 
Syed Dastagir v. T.R. Gopalakrishna Settty, [1999] 6 SCC 337; Motilal 
Jain v. Ramdasi Devi (Smt.) and Ors., [2000] 6 SCC 420 and Surya Narain 
Upadhyaya v. Ram Roop Pandey and Ors., AIR (1994) SC 105, relied on. 
Prem Raj v. The D.L.F. Housing and Construction (Private) Ltd. and 
Anr., AIR (1968) SC 1355 and Ardeshir H. Mama v. Flora Sassoon, AIR (1928) 
PC 208, referred to. 
Cork v. Amhergate etc. and Railway Co., (1851) 117 ER 1229, referred 
to. 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6260 of2004. 
From the Judgment and Orde

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