ANDHRA PRADESH STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION versus THE INCOME-TAX OFFICER AND ANR.
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
7 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANDHRA PRADESH STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION v. THE INCOME-TAX OFFICER AND ANR. 17 [P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J., K. N. WANCHOO, J.C. SHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR ANDS. M. SIKRI JJ.] Income-tax-Income of State Road Transport Corporation whether income of the State-Whether exempt-Constitution of India, Art. 289-Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), s. 22. The Income-tax Officer (respondent No. 1) served a notice under s. 22 of the Income-tax Act on the appellant. Upon the receipt of the notice, the appellant appeared before the Income- tax Officer. The appellant pleaded before the Income-tax Officer that it did not fall under any of the five categories of assessees under s. 3 of the Income-tax Act. The appellant also raised the contention that it was a local authority exempt from income- tax. All these contentions were rejected by respondent No. 1 with the result that the impugned orders of assessment came to be passed. The appellant filed Writ Petitions before the High Court in which it challenged the impugned orders of assessment passed by respondent No. 1. In its Writ Petitions, the appellant claimed an order, writ or other appropriate direction quashing the assess- ment orders passed by respondent No. 1. The High Court dismiss.. ed these \vrit petitions. The High Court held that the appellant could not claim the- exemption under Art. 289(1) because it was not a state-owned Corporation. The High Court grante-d a certi- ficate under Art. 133 of the Constitution and hence the appeal. Held: (i) Art. 289 of the Constitution cons'sts of three clauses. The first clause confers exemption from union taxation on the property and income of a State. Clause (2) then provides that the income from trade or busi- ness carried on bv the Government of a State or on its behalf which would not have been taxable under cl. (1), can be taxed, provided a I aw is made by Parliament in that behalf. In other words cl. (2) is an exception to cl. (1 ). Clause (3) then empowers Parliament to declare by law that any trade or business would be taken out of the purview of cl. (2) and restored to the area covered by cl. (1) by declaring that the said trade or business is incidental to the ordinarv func- tions of Government. In other words, cl. (3) is an exception to the exception prescribed by cl. (2). (ii) A trading activity carried on by the corporation (ap.J)el- Iant) is not a trading activity carried on by the State department- ~lly, nor is it a trading activity carried on by a State through its agents appointe-d in that behalf because according to statute the Corporation has a personalitv of its own and this personality iโข distinct from that of the State or other shareholders. ยท Ali the relevant provisions of the impugned Act also emphati- cally bring out the separate personality of the Corporation. Sec- tion 30 of the Act also does not suggest that the income of the 1964 March 5 18 SUPREl\IE COURT REPORTS [1964} 1964 Corporation is the income of the State. All that s. 30 requires is Andhra Pradesh that a part of that income may be entrusted to the State Gov- State Road Tra"8porternment for a specific purpose of road development. Therefore, Oorporation the income derived by the appellant from its trading activity Th 1 v. T cannot be said to be the income of the State either under cl (1) o.ffic,;".':J.'An:" or cl. (2) of Art. 289. The American doctrine of the immunity of State agencies or instrumentalities from Federal taxation has no application to the present case. Akadasi Padhan v. State of Orissa [1963) Supp. 2 S.C.R. 691, distinguished. Mark Graves, John J. Merrill and John P. Hennessy v. People of the State of New York Upon the Relation of James B.O'ke~fe, 83 Law. Ed. 927 and Clallan County v. United States of America, 68 Law Ed. 328, no application. State of West Bengal v. Union of India [1964) 1 S.C.R. 371, relied on. M'Culloch v. Maryland, (1819) 4 Wheat 316, Bank of Toronto v. Lambe "(1887) 12 A.C. 575 and Webb v. Outrim [1907) A.C. 81, referred to. Tamlin v. Hansaford, (1950] K.B. 18, relied on. (iii) It is hardly necessary fur the Act to make a provision that tax, if chargeable would be paid. In fact, the Companies Act which deals with companies does not make such a specific provision, though no one can seriously suggest that there would be repugnancy between the provisions of the Companies Act and ยท the Income-tax Act. Ther
Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.
Lex