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ANANTA MUKHI, @ ANANTA HARI versus STATE OF WEST BENGAL

Citation: [1972] 3 S.C.R. 379 · Decided: 03-02-1972 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: J.M. SHELAT · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

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ANANTA MUKHI, @ ANANTA HARi 
v. 
STATE OF WEST BENGAL 
February 3, 1972 
379 
[J. M. SHELAT, H. R. KHANNA AND K. K. MATHEW, JJ.J 
West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act 1970-Sec. 3 (2) 
and Sec. 3(3)-Their scope. 
Petitioner, through Jail, filed a writ petition under art. 32 for a writ 
of habeas corpus. He was ordered to be detained u/s. 3 of West Bengai 
(Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, 1970, with a view to preventing 
him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State 
or the maintenance of public order. The grounds of detention were tbnt 
the petitioner along with 50/60 other persons armed with lethal weapons 
raided the house of a person on October 4, 1969 ot night and looted cash, 
ornan1ents etc., ·and on November 81 1969 at ~bout 10 p.m., the petitioner 
along with 20/30 associates armed with lethal weapons, raided the house 
of another citizen and .kflled his two brothers and looted ornaments etc. 
It was contended on beh~lf of tb.c petitioner that the detaining autho-
rity had taken into consideration facts extraneous to Sec. 3 of the Act 
in making the order of detention and therefore, the said order was illegal 
and secondly, that the order of detention showed that the District Magis-
trate h~d not duly applied his mind before making the detention order as 
the petitioner was detained with a vie\Y to preventing him from acting 
in any manner prejudicial to the seCutity of the State or the maintenance 
of public order. According to the petitioner, the detaining authority was 
not sure as to whether the petitioner \.Vas detained for a.cling in any 
manner prejudicial to the security of the Stale or whether he was detained 
from acting in any manner .prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 
Tue District Magistrate could not make ~n indefinite order by using the 
word 'or' in the detention order and so the order was bad. 
Dismissing 
the petition, 
HELD : (i) Tue activities of the petitioner as mentioned in the 
grounds of detention were not of an extraneous character but fell within 
the expression acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of State 
or the m~intenance of public order, as defined in Sub-Section (2) of 
Section 3 of the Act. 
According to the grounds of detention, the peti-
tioner and his associates committed offences punishable with death or im-
prisonment for life or imprisonment for a term exceeding seven ~ars or 
more, and as iuch, the case of the petitioner was covered by Clause (d) 
of Sub-Section (2) of Section 3 of the Act. 
Further, the activities of 
the petitioner disturbed public order and the petitioner became a terror 
to the residents of the locality ~nd under the circumstances, the District 
Magistrate was empowered to exercise his powers under Sub-Section (3) 
of Section 3 of the Act. (395 F] 
:iso 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1972] 3 s.c.R. 
(ii) The Special definition given in Sub-Section (2) of Section 3 of 
1he Act of the expression1 "acting in any manner prejudicial to the security 
·Of the State or the maintenance of public order", ls of comprehensive 
nature '3nd each one of the activities mentioned in the various clauses of 
the said sub-section constitutes an act prejudicial to the security of the 
State or the maintenance of public order. The presence of the \vord "oi"" 
in the definition itself tends to show that the use of that word in the 
order is not impermissible and there was no element of casualness or 
absence of due application of the mind in the moking of the impugned 
order. [397 DJ 
Shelat J. Dissenting: The c"nstruction of the definition in S. 3(2) 
cannot mean that .any one ·of the activities enumerated in Clauses (a) tO 
(e) would fall under both the grounds, namely, the security of the State 
and the rnainten3nce of public order. 
An act, such as, use of or instigating to use a lethal weopon for the 
purpose mentioned in Clause (a) (i) or causing insult to the national flag 
mentioned under Clause ( e) would be a ground of ·detention, if it either 
affects, or is likely to ~fleet adversely either the security of the State or 
public order depending upon the potentiality and the extent of the act in 
question. 
Such use or instigation or insult to national flag, might affect 
only public order and on a state-wide potentiality, it might affect adversely 
even the security of the State. 
But irrespeCtive of such reach OF poten· 
tiality, the clause cannot n1ean that such an act in

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