AMMAL CHANDRA DUTT versus IIND ADDL. DISTT. JUDGE & ORS.

Citation: [1988] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 722 · Decided: 01-11-1988 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: R.S. PATHAK · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
AMMAL CHANDRA DUTI 
v. 
IIND ADDL. DISTI. JUDGE & ORS. 
NOVEMBER 1, 1988 
[R.S. PATHAK, CJ. AND S. NATARAJAN, J.] 
U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) 
Act 1972/U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Evic-
tion) Rules, 1972-Section 21/Rules 18-Release of house on requirement 
of landlord-Second application-Whether permissible. 
Statutory Interpretation: Where situation and context warrants 
word 'shall' has to be construed as 'may'. 
In 1967 the second respondent landlord applied to the Prescribed 
Authority, under section 3 of the U .P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and 
Eviction Act, 1947 for permission to file a suit for eviction against the 
appellant-tenant on the ground of his own requirement because his 
brother with whom he was living had asked him to find accommodation 
elsewhere. This application was rejected. 
After the 1947 Rent Act was replaced by the U .P. Urban Buildings 
(Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act 1972, the second respon-
dent again sought the permission of the Prescribed Authority for reco· 
very of possession of the leased premises either fully or partially, on the 
ground that he was living in great hardship in a single room in a house. 
The Prescribed Authority refused to grant the permission on the 
ground that the application had been made within a period of six 
months from the commencement of the 1972 Rent Act and hence it was 
barred by Rule 18(1) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Let-
ting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972. The Appellate Authority, how-
ever, granted permission to the second respondent to recover possession 
of the ground floor portion of the house. The appellant moved a petition 
in the High Court against the order of the Appellate Authority but did 
not succeed. 
Before this Court the appellant contends that(l) a second applica-
tion on the same ground made within six months from the commence-
ment of the 1972 Act was barred under Rule 18(1) of the 1972 Rules; (2) the 
High Court's view that it is not barred because it is the circumstan-
H 
ces of requirement and not the nature of the requirement that would 
722 
A.C. DU1T v. ADDL. DISTI. JUDGE 
723 
constitute the ground of eviction is erroneous and unsustainable (3) the 
Act and the Rules do not permit tbe creation of two dwelling units in a 
building covered by a single tenancy; ( 4) the Appellate Authority has 
erred in rendering a finding against the appellant in the matter of 
comparative hardship; and (5) the Appellate Authority and the High 
Court have failed to notice that without the ground floor, the first and 
second floors cannot be used as residence because the bath and toilet 
rooms are situated only in the ground floor. 
Dismissing the appeal, it was, 
HELD: (1) All that Rule 18(1) says is that if a second application 
A 
B 
is made for release of the house on which permission to sue was sought C 
for in the previous application on the same ground within a period of six 
months from the date of the final order in that application or within six 
months from the commencement of the Act, whichever is later, "the 
prescribed authority shall accept the findings in those proceedings as 
conclusive." [727E-F] 
(2) Even if the two applications are treated as having been made 
on the same ground, the second application would not attract the opera· 
tion of Rule 18(1) since the Rule contains only a formula of presumption 
based on facts. The prescription of the role is only of a directory nature 
and not of a mandatory nature. [728C] 
(3) In the interpretation of statutes, where the situation and the 
context warrants, the word "shall" used in a section or role has to be 
construed as "may". The ·present context is one such where the words 
"the prescribed Authority shall accept the fmdings in those proceedings 
D 
E 
as conclusive" have to be read as "the Prescribed Authoritl'..may accept 
the findings in those proceedings as conclusive" because the findings 
F 
are based upon existence of facts. [728G-HJ 
(4) It will be inequitable and unrealistic to construe Rule 18(1) as 
containing an inexorable legal prescription for rejecting a second appli· 
cation filed within the prescribed time limit solely on the basis of the 
findings rendered in the earlier application. [729F] 
G 
(5) The long interval of time between the rejection of the trrst 
application and the date of making the second application viz., about 
five years, and t

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