AMIT SINGH versus STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR.

Citation: [2011] 9 S.C.R. 890 · Decided: 08-08-2011 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P. SATHASIVAM, B.S. CHAUHAN · Disposal: Case Allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

[2011] 9 S.C.R. 890 
A 
AMIT SINGH 
v. 
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR. 
(Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 16 of 2010) 
B 
AUGUST 08, 2011 
[P. SATHASIVAM AND DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, JJ.] 
JUVENILE JUSTICE (CARE AND PROTECTION OF 
CHILDREN) ACT, 2000: 
c 
ss. 2(1), 7-A, 15, 20, Explanation (as amended by 
,_ 
Amendment Act, 2006) and s. 64 read with s. 15 - Petitioner, 
along with others, convicted and sentenced to imprisonment 
for life u/ss 395, 120-B /PC etc. - Writ petition praying for 
D release of the petitioner in terms of the provisions of the Act 
on the ground that he was below 18 years of age but on the 
' 
date of occurrence, i.e., 1.5.1999 - HELD: Explanation to s. 
20 which was added in 2006 makes it clear that in all pending 
cases, which would include not only trials but even 
E subsequent proceedings by way of revision or appeal, the 
determination of juvenility of a juvenile would be in terms of 
clause (/) of s.2, even if juvenile ceased to be a juvenile on 
or before 01.04.2001, when the Act came into force and the 
~ 
provisions of the Act would apply as if the said provision had 
.... 
F 
been in force for all purposes and for all material times when 
the alleged offence was committed - The petitioner was 
juvenile at the time of commission of the offence and, as such, 
entitled to the benefit of ss.2(1), 7-A, 20 and 64 of the Act -
The claim of juvenility can be raised before any court at any 
G 
stage, even after final disposal of the case -
State 
Government or the Board could, either suo motu or on an 
application made for the purpose, review the case of juvenile, 
determine the juveni/ity and pass an appropriate order uls 64 
of the Act for immediate re/ease of the juvenile whose period 
of detention had exceeded the maximum period provided in 
H 
890 
) , 
AMIT SINGH v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR. 891 
s. 15 of the Act i.e. 3 years - As the petitioner has already A 
undergone 12 years in jail, he is directed to be released 
forthwith - Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) 
Rules, 2007 - rr. 12 and 98 - Constitution of India, 1950 -
Articles 32 and 21. 
The petitioner along with others was convicted of B 
offences punishable ulss 396, 506, 341 379 read with s. 
120-B IPC and was sentenced to imprisonment for life. He 
filed the instant writ petition contending that his date of 
birth was 10.5.1982 and, as such, on the date of 
occurrence, i.e., 1.5.1999, when the offence took place, he C 
was less than 18 years of age. He prayed for a writ in the 
nature of habeas corpus directing the respondents to 
release him from jail as his detention was contrary to 
Article 21 of the Constitution of India and the provisions 
of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) D 
Act, 2000. 
Allowing the writ petition, the Court 
HELD: 1. In the Birth Certificate (Annexure-P1 ), the E 
Transfer Certificate (Annexure-P2), and the mark sheet 
issued by the Council for the Indian School Certificate 
Examinations, the date of birth of the petitioner has been 
recorded as 10.05.1982 and duly certified and 
authenticated by the authorities concerned. In view of r. 
F 
12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of 
Children) Rules, 2000 all these documents are relevant 
and admissible in evidence. Thus, on the date of the 
incident which took place on 01.05.1999, the petitioner · 
was below 18 years, and, therefore, he was a juvenile in 
terms of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of G 
Children) Act, 2000 and, as such, is entitled to get the 
benefit of provisions ulss. 2(1), 7 A, 20 and 64 of the Act. 
[para 11] [901-B-F] 
Hari Ram vs. State of Rajasthan and Others 2009 H 
892 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS . 
[2011] 9 S.C.R. 
A (7) SCR 623 = (2009) 13 SCC 211; and Shah Nawaz vs. 
State of U.P. 2011 (8) JT 475 - relied on. 
1.2 No doubt, the benefit was not claimed by the 
petitioner earlier; neither the claim was raised before the 
8 trial court nor thereafter up to this Court. The petitioner 
has substantiated that he was a juvenile as per the Act 
and he could be tried only by the Board and, therefore, 
the matter should be referred before the Board for trial. It 
is further seen that the proceedings were started against 
C him on 01.05.1989 before the regular court and during the 
pendency of the trial, the Act was enacted and it is his 
claim that inadvertently he was not advised that he is 
entitled to get the benefit under the Act after the 
enactment because he had already completed the ag

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