AMISH DEVGAN versus UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

Citation: [2020] 14 S.C.R. 198 · Decided: 07-12-2020 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: A.M. KHANWILKAR · Disposal: Disposed off

Cited by 2 judgment(s) · cites 22 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2020] 14 S.C.R.
   [2020] 14 S.C.R. 198
AMISH DEVGAN
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
(Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 160 of 2020)
DECEMBER 07, 2020
[A. M. KHANWILKAR AND SANJIV KHANNA, JJ.]
Constitution of India – Arts. 19(1)(a), 19(2) and 32 – Penal
Code, 1860 – ss. 295A, 153A, 505(2) – Hate speech – The petitioner
hosted and anchored a debate on the Places of worship (Special
Provisions) Act, 1991 on a news channel – While hosting the debate,
the petitioner had described Pir Hazrat Moinuddin Chishti, as an
invader, terrorist and robber who had come to India to convert its
population to Islam – Post the telecast as many as seven FIRs
concerning the said episode were filed and registered against the
petitioner in the States of Rajasthan, Telangana, Maharashtra and
Madhya Pradesh – It was alleged that petitioner had deliberately
and intentionally insulted a Pir or a pious saint belonging to the
Muslim community, revered even by Hindus, and thereby hurt and
incited religious hatred towards Muslims – The petitioner field writ
petition and sought (a) quashing of FIRs/ complaints; (b) in
alternative, transfer and club the FIRs mentioned with the First FIR,
i.e. FIR at Ajmer, Rajasthan; (c) direction that no coercive process
to be taken against the petitioner in the FIR and the Union of India
to provide him and his family adequate safety and security – In his
submissions, petitioner expressed regret and claimed that words were
uttered inadvertently and by mistake – An interim order was passed
by the Supreme Court that stayed further steps/action on the FIRs
mentioned in the writ petition and petitioner was protected against
any coercive process arising out of or relating to the said FIRs –
Held: Three elements can be used to define and identify ‘hate speech’
namely- content-based element, intent-based element and harm-
based element – The content-based element involves open use of
words and phrases generally considered to be offensive to a
particular community and objectively offensive to the society – The
intent-based element of ‘hate speech’ requires the speaker’s message
to intend only to promote hatred, violence or resentment against a
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particular class or group without communicating any legitimate
message – The harm or impact-based element refers to the
consequences of the ‘hate speech’ that is to harm victim which can
be violent or such as loss of self-esteem, economic or social
subordination – S.295A of the Penal Code encapsulates all three
elements, namely, it refers to the content-based element when it refers
to words either spoken or written or by signs or visible representation
– Similarly, sub-section 505 of the Penal Code refers to a person
publishing or circulating any statement or report containing rumour
or alarming news – In the instant case, the petitioner was equal co-
participant, rather than a mere host – The transcript, including the
offending portion, would form a part of the ‘content’, but any
evaluation would require examination and consideration of the
variable ‘context’ as well as intent and the ‘harm/impact’ – These
have to evaluated before the Court can form an opinion on whether
an offence is made out – The petitioner also relies on his apology –
Thus, it is not an appropriate stage to quash FIR and stall the
investigation into all the relevant aspects – The interim protection
granted to the petitioner against arrest subject to his joining and
cooperating in investigation to continue – Further, prayer to transfer
all the FIRs to police station Dargah, Ajmer, Rajasthan accepted.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.156(1) and s.179 –
Conjoint reading of – Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 295A, 153A, 505(2)
– Hate speech – Cause of Action – While hosting a debate show,
the petitioner had described Pir Hazrat Moinuddin Chishti, as an
invader, terrorist and robber who had come to India to convert its
population to Islam – Post the telecast as many as seven FIRs
concerning the said episode were filed and registered against the
petitioner in the States of Rajasthan, Telangana, Maharashtra and
Madhya Pradesh – Petitioner contended that criminal proceedings
arising from the impugned FIRs ought to be quashed as these FIRs
were registered in places where no ‘cause of action’ arose – Held:
s.179 of Cr.P.C. provides that an offence is triable at the place where
an act is done or its consequence ensues – The audience, including
the complainants, were locat

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