AMINA AHMED DOSSA AND ORS. versus STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

Citation: [2001] 1 S.C.R. 345 · Decided: 15-01-2001 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K.T. THOMAS · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

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AMINA AHMED DOSSA AND ORS. 
A 
v. 
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 
JANUARY 15, 2001 
[K.T. THOMAS AND R.P. SETHI, JJ.] 
B 
7 
Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 Sections 8 
and 19-Claim of rights and interests by third party in properties of 
proclaimed person sought to be attached under law-Order of Designated c. 
Court rejecting the claims-Interlocutory order or final order-Held, it is an 
i11t.er!ixZ1tory order for third party claimants 
Words and Phrases: 
Interlocutory Order-Meaning of-In the context of Code of Criminal 
D 
Procedure, 1973-Sections 82 to 84. 
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Appellants claimed rights and interests before Designated Court in 
properties of a proclaimed person under Section 84 Cr.P.C., which were 
sought to be attached under Section 8 of Terrorists and Disruptive Activities 
(Prevention) Act, 1987. The Designated Court rejected the claims of the E 
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appellants. Hence the appeal. 
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...,, 
· Respondent-State contended that the order of the Designated Court is 
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only an interlocutory order and therefore the remedy of appeal is not available 
to the appellants. 
F 
The appellants, on the other hand, contended that the order of the 
Designated Court is a final ordi;r and therefore an appeal lies under the Act. 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
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HELD: 1.1. A combined reading of Sections 8 and 19 of the Terrorists G 
and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 and Section 84(4) of the 
Code makes it abundantly clear that the person not being a proclaimed 
offender against whom an order is passed under Section 8 of the Act read 
with Section 84 of the Code has remedy of filing a suit which reflects the 
intention of the Legislature to treat the order of the Designated Court, in H 
345 
346 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2001) I S.C.R. 
A so far as it affects the third party claimant, to be an interlocutory· order. Such 
Y 
an order would, however, be deemed to be a final order so far as the prosecution, 
the State and the proclaimed offender are concerned particularly in view of 
the provisions of Section 96 of the Code. Interlocutory order in law means, 
not that which decides the cause but which only settles intervening matter 
B relating to the cause. Such an order is made pending the cause and before 
the final hearing on merits. It is made to secure some end and purpose 
necessary and essential to the progress of the case and generally collateral 
to the issues to be settled by the court in the final judgment. Orders 
summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for 
reports, attaching the properties (with the exception of Section 86) and such 
c other steps in the aid of pending proceedings shall amount to be interlocutory 
orders against which no appeal can be oreferred with the aid of Section 19 
of the Act. As the order attaching the property in so far as it relates to the 
claimant third party, is subject to the decision of the civil court, it cannot 
be held to be a final order. [349-F-G-H; 350-A-B] 
D 
t.2. The order impugned herein has not, in any manner, finally 
adjudicated the rights of the appellants entitling them to file the appeal on 
the ground of their claim of the impugned order being final. Having regard 
to the scheme of the Act, read with relevant provisions of the Code, the 
expression "interlocutory order" appearing in Section 19 of the Act would 
E have to be understood to be not deciding the rights of the claimants finally 
and thus are interlocutory orders. Giving any other interpretation would 
defeat the dominant purpose of the Act and result in not only multiplicity of 
litigation but ultimately conflicting verdicts. If the impugned order is held 
to be not an interlocutory order and subject to appeal, the consequence would 
be that despite dismissal of the appeal by this Court, the aggrieved claimant 
F would be entitled to resort to the remedy of filing the suit with the aid and 
under the cover of the mandate of sub-section (4) of Section 84 of the Code. 
In that event a fresh litigation would commence, not only unnecessarily 
burdening the parties and wasting the public time of the courts but also 
creating embarrassing positions for the civil courts to adjudicate afresh the 
G claims of the parties as finally determined by this Court in proceedings 
under the Act. Such could not be the intention of the Legislature. Upon a 
harmonious interpretation of the various provisions of the Act and the Code, 
there is no es

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