AMIN LAL versus HUNNA MAL

Citation: [1965] 1 S.C.R. 393 · Decided: 29-09-1964 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 3 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
AMIN LAL 
v. 
HUNNAMAL 
"September 29, 1964 
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAI!., C. J., K. N. WANCHOO, 
M. HIDAYATULLAH, RAGHUBAI!. DAYAL AND 
J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.) 
393 
The Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951), s. 90(3)-
Applicability to amended petition-Competency of Tribunal to 
allow 
amendments-Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908). 0.1, r. 1G-
Joinder of parti~Limitation. 
The appellant challenged the election of the respondent to the 1>'tate 
Legislative Assembly by alleging corrupt practices against the respon-
dent, bis agents and other persons. The respondent raised a preliminary 
objection that the allegations regarding corrupt practices were vague and 
indefinite. 
The Tribunal held that the election petition suffered from 
thO<!e defects and was liable to be dismissed unless the appellant either 
applied for leave to amend the petition or amplified the particulars as 
to corrupt practices. The appellant filed a ·petition for amendment as 
well as an amended election petition. Thereupon, the respondent filed an 
application praying for the · dismmsaJ of the election petition on the 
grounds, that one of the persons who was alleged by the appellant to have 
been guilty of corrupt practices was a candidate for election, that he 
was therefore a necessary party to the petition and that as he was not 
made a party, the election petition was liable to be · dismissed under 
s. 90(3) of the Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951). The 
Tribunal, after argwhents, dismissed the election petition. The appeal to 
the High Court was unsuccessful. 
In the appeal to. the Supreme Conrt 
it was contended that : (i) section 90(3) of the Act applied only to 
petitions as originally filed and not to amended petitions, (ii) there was 
no allegation of corrupt practice against the candidate who was not im-
pleaded, (iii) the Tribunal had no power to allow ar direct amendment 
of the election petition and (iv) the Tribunal should have either allowed 
the appellant to join as a respondent the candidate who was not im-
pleaded or allowed him to further amend the petition by deleting all 
reference to that candidate. 
HEW: (i) Section 90(3) gave an 
independent power to the 
Tribunal to dismiss an election petition on the ground of non..:ompliauce 
with the provisions of ss. 81 and 82 despite the fact that the Election 
Commission had not chosen to dismiss it under s. 85. Since an election 
petition could be permitted by the Tribunal to be amended, a petition 
which had been amended would be the only petition before it 
and 
the Tribunal could exercise the powers conferred upon it by s. 90(3) 
with respect to such an amended petition. [3990-H]. 
(ii) The allegations against the candidate who was not imp leaded 
amounted to allegations of currupt practice. [400E]. 
(iii) The Tribunal was competent to allow or give an optiop to 
the appellant to amend the petition. 
By giving such option to amend 
or furnish better particulars the Tribunal was not enabling the appel-
lant to remove the defect pertaining to the presentation of the petition 
or the joinder of parties under ss. 81 and 82 of the Act. [402A-B]. 
394 
SUPREME COURT RE!'ORTS 
[ 1965] I S.C.R. 
Harish Chandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh, (1957] 
S. C. R. 370, 
A 
followed. 
(iv) Assuming that the Tribunal could pennit joinder of 
parties, 
the p=entation of the application of the appellant under 0. I, r. 10 
of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act 5 of 1908) was beyond the period 
prescribed for presenting an election petition and 
therefore, could not 
be granted. 
In any event the matter was within the deacretion of tbe 
Tribunal with which this Court would not lightly interfere. The Tri-
B 
bunal was also right in not allowing a further amendment, as to allow 
>uch an amendment for avoiding the penalty under s. 90(3) would have 
been grossly improper. (4020-0]. 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 670 of 
1964. 
Appeal from the judgment and order dated August 27, 1963 
of the Punjab High Court in F.A.0. No. 4E of 1963. 
M. C. Setalvad, Anand Swaroop and Janardan Sharma, 
for 
the appellant. 
Veda Vyasa and B. D. Jain, for the respondent. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
Mudhollw J. The short point for consideration in this appeal 
from the judgment of the Punjab High Court is whether the Election 
Tribunal, Rohtak, was justified in dismissing the election petition 
under sub-s. (3) of s. 90 of the Representation of the People

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