AMBIKA PRASAD MISHRA ETC. versus STATE OF U.P. AND ORS. ETC.

Citation: [1980] 3 S.C.R. 1159 · Decided: 09-05-1980 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: Y.V. CHANDRACHUD · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 3 judgment(s) · cites 4 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

.. • 
1159 
AMBIKA PRASAD MISHRA ETC. 
v. 
STATE OF U.P. AND ORS. ETC. 
May 9, 1980 
[Y. V. CliANDRACHUD, C.J., P. N. BHAGWATI, V. R. KRlsHNA IYBR, 
B· 
V. D. TULZAPURKAR AND A. P. SEN, JJ.] 
Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960-Con.rtitu-
tional Validity-Jlalue of stare decisi.f.-vis-a-vis judicial review. 
Dismissing !he appeals and the Writ Petitions, the Court· 
HEID : ( 1) .-It is fundamental that the nation's Constitution is not kept 
in 
constant uncertainty by judicial review every season because it paralyses, 
by 
perennial suspense, all legislative and administrative action on vit.al issues deteind 
by the brooding interest of forensic blow-up. This, if permitted, may well be 
a kind of judicial destabilisation of Stare action too dangerous to be indulged in 
save where national crisis of great moment to the life, liberty and safety of this 
country and its millions are at stake, or the basic direction of th'e nation itoelf 
is in peril of a shake up. The decision in Kesavananda Bharati's case, therefore. 
upholding the vir'es of Article 3 lA in unequivocal terms binds the conrt on the 
simple score of stare decisi~ and the constitutional 
ground of Article 
141 •. 
Further, fatal flaws silenced by ea.rlier rulings cannot survive after d'eath because 
a decision does not lose its authority "merely because it was badly argu'ed, inad&-
quately considered and fallaciously reasoned". And none of the..., misfortunes 
can be imputed to Bharati's case. [1164 C-0, 1165 C-DJ 
(2). The sweep of Article 3 lA is wide and indubitably em bra= legislation 
on land ceilings. Equitable distribution of lands, annihilation of monopoly of 
ownership by imposition of oeiling and regeneration of the rural economy by 
diverre plaaning and strategies a.re covered by the 
armour of Article 3 IA. 
Article 3 IA repulses, therefore, all invasions on ceiling legislation armed with 
Articles 14, 19 and 31. [1165 D-B, 1166 D-B] 
Raniit Singh and Ors. v. State of Puniab and Ors. [1965] I S.C.R. 82, State of 
'-
Kera/a and Anr. v. The Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing (W...Wng) Co. Ltd. 
' 
Etc. [1974) I S.C.R. 671, reiterated. 
(3). The decision in Maneka Gandhfs case is no universal nostrum or curo-
all. Nor can it be applicable to the land reform law which is in another donmin 
o· 
E 
F 
of comtitutional jurisprudence and quite apart from personal liberty in Article 21. 
G· 
To contend that land reform law, if unreasonable violates Article 21 as expan-
llYcly constnled in Maneka Gantlhf• case is incorrect. [1168 E-OJ 
(4). Secti<in 5(6) of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdinp Act, 
1960 is fair, valid and not violative Of Article 19(1 )(f) Of the Constitution. 
There is no blanket ban by it but only qnalffied invalidation of c:er!aln sinister 
a.ignment! etc. There is nothing in this section which is morally wrong nor la 
such an embargo which cilmes into force only on a well recognised date not 
H-
from an arbitrarily 1etrospectiV'e 
past constitutionally anathematlc. Article 
t!l(l)(f) ;,, not aboo!ute in operation and is subject, under Article 19(6), to 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
.1160 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1980] 3 s.c.R. 
reasonable restrictions such as the one contained in Section 5(6). 
Furth~r it is 
perfectly open to the legislature as anciUary 'to its main policy to prev'eiit activi-
ties which defeat the statutory purpose, to provide for invalidation of such action. 
\\'hen th'e alienations are invalidated because they are made after a statutory date 
fixed with a purpose, there is sense in this prohibition. Otherwise, all the lands 
would have been transferred and little would have been left by way of surplus. 
[1169 A·B. D, F·G, 1170 C, E·F] 
(5). Articles 14 and 15 and the humane spirit of ttie Preamble rebel against 
the defacto denial of proprietory personhood or womanhood. But this legal 
sentiment and jural value must not run riot and destroy the provisions which do 
not discriminate between man and woman qua man and woman but merely 
organise a scheme where life realism is legislatively pragmatised. Such a scheme 
may marginally affect gender justice but does not abridge, wee-bit, the rights of 
women. If land-holding .and ceiling thereon are organised with the paramount 
purpose of maximising surpluses without maim;ng women's ownership, any plea 
of sex discrimination as a. nieans to sabotage what is socially desirable measure 
cannot be permitted. [1173 D-F] 
From a reading of Sect

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