AMARNATH ASHRAM TRUST SOCIETY versus GOVERNOR OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS.

Citation: [1997] SUPP. 6 S.C.R. 143 · Decided: 03-12-1997 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: G.T. NANAVATI · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

AMARNATH ASHRAM TRUST SOCIETY 
A 
v. 
GOVERNOR OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS. 
DECEMBER 3, 1997 
[G.T. NANAVATI AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.) 
B 
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 : Pa1t VII and Sections 4 and 6. 
Acquisition of land-For purpose of playground for students of a school 
mn by a Society (Company)-Declaration under S.6 issued after completion C 
of all fonnalities including execution of agreement for payment of cost of 
acquisition-Entire cost was to be bome by Society-Notification under S.4 
stated land was required for public purpose-Held: Merely because land was 
needed for public pwpose it cannot be said that the acquisition was for public 
purpose to the Society and not under Chapter VII-Land Acquisition (Com-
pany) Rules, 1963, R.4. 
D 
Section 48 and Pa1t VII-Acquisition of land for company under Part 
VII-Govemment withdrew from acquisition without consent of company on 
the ground that acquisition was not sustainable since no pa1t of cost of 
acquisition was bome by the Government-Held : Discretion of Govemment 
to withdraw from acquisition justiciable and not absolute-Can be challenged E 
on ground that power was executed ma/a fide or in an arbitrary 111an-
ne1o..-..{)ecision of Govemment not sustainable being arbitrary and not bona 
fide-Question of withdrawal of the State Government from acquisition 
without the consent of the company in such a case, not decided. 
Administrative Law. 
Administrative action-Where as a result of a decision taken by the 
Government the other party is likely to be prejudicially affected the Govern-
ment has to exercise its power bona fide and not arbitrarily. 
Practice and Procedure : 
Inconsistent plea-Plea that is contrary to the case pleaded before High 
Court cannot be raised before Supreme Court. 
G 
The appellant was a society registered under the Society Registration 
Act, 1860 and was running a public school. The appellant wanted land H 
143 
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144 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 6 S.C.R. 
f-
A adjacent to its school building for the purpose of a playground for its 
students. The appellant, therefore, moved the State Government to acquire 
' 
that land for it. The State Government issued a notification under Section 
4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 stating that the land was needed for a 
public purpose and that the acquisition was for a company under Part VII 
I-
B 
of the Act. The State Government thereafter issued a declaration under 
Section 6 of the Act after completing all formalities including execution of 
agreement for payment of cost of acquisition. The entire cost of acquisition 
was to be borne by the appellant-Society. The owner challenged this 
acquisition of land by a writ petition filed in the High Court During the 
pend ency of the writ petition the State Government withdrew from acquisi-
c tion and de-notified the land under Section 48 of the Act on the ground 
that the acquisition would not be sustainable as no part of the cost of 
acc1uisition was to be borne by the State Government. The writ petition 
filed by the appellant challenging the aforesaid de-notification of the 
acquisitior1 was dismissed by the High Court. Hence this appeal. 
D 
On behalf of the appellant it was contended that when acquisition 
was under Part VII, i.e., when land was acquired for a company it was not 
open for the Government to withdraw from such acc1uisition especially 
when all formalities were completed including issuance of Section 6 
notification without the consent of the appellant-Society (company); and 
E that the State Government withdrew from acquisition on a misconception 
of law that since the land was for a public purpose at least a part of the 
cost of acquisition was required to be borne by the State Government. 
On behalf of the respondent it was contended that the acquisition of 
F 
land was for a public purpose and not under Chapter VII of the Act and, 
therefore, the decision of the State Government to withdraw from the 
acquisition was not arbitrary or illegal. 
Allowing the appeal, this Court 
G 
HELD : 1. It is now well established that if the cost of acquisition is 
borne either wholly or partly by the Government, the acquisition can be said 
to be for a public purpose within the meaning of the Land Acquisition Act, 
1894. Admittedly, in the present case the entire cost of acquisition is to be 
borne by the appellant-society and, therefore, it is an acquisition for a com-
pany and not for a public purpose. Therefore, simply because in t

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