AMARJIT SINGH versus SMT. KHATOON QUAMARAIN

Citation: [1987] 1 S.C.R. 275 · Decided: 18-11-1986 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: SABYASACHI MUKHERJI · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 2 judgment(s) · cites 1 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

AMARJIT SINGH 
v. 
A 
SMT. KHATOON QUAMARAIN 
NOVEMBER 18, 1986. 
[SABYASACHI MUKHARJI AND K.N. SINGH, JJ.) 
B 
Delhi Rent. Control Act, 1958, s. 14(/)(e)-Bonafide Personal 
necessity of landlord-'Has no other reasonable. suitable residential 
accomodation'-Interpretation of-Events and developments subse-
quent to initiation of eviction proceedings-Whether Court should take 
'!-cognizance of. 
Statutory Interpretation-Rent Control Legislations-Interpreta-
tion of-Duty of Courts. 
· 
The respondent-landlady was the owner of a premises consisting 
c 
of ground Door and first Door. Both the Doors had been let out on rent 
D 
and she was living with one of her··relatives. She filed a petition for 
eviction of the appellant-tenant from the first Door of the premises on 
the ground of bonafide personal necessity. She had stated in the P.,tition 
lhat she needed one Door for her residence •nd the other one i.e. the 
ground Door to l~t But to have income to support herself because that 
was her only source oflivelihood. During the pendency of the petition, 
E 
the ground Door in the house 'fell vacant twice and she let it out on 
higher rent. 
The Trial Court allowed the eviction petition u/s. 14(1)(e) of Delhi 
Rent Control Act, 1958 on the ground (i) that the landlady must have 
some income; and (ii) that it was landlady's choice to occupy the first 
~ 
Door premises and there was no mala fide, her requirement was bona 
11 
' fide. The High Court upheld the aforesaid order of eviction. 
. 
. 
I 
F 
"' 
In appeal to the Supreme Court, it was contended on behalf of the 
appellant-tenant that the second limb of the definition contained in s. 
14(1 )(e) of the Rent Act was not satisfied since the respondent-landlady 
had other reasonably suitable accommodation and by her own conduct, 
she had disentitled herself of the user of the same inasmuch as the 
accommodation of ground Door fell vacant twice when tenant left dur' 
ing the pendency of the proceeding for eviction but she chose not to go 
into that possession but let out the same to fetch higher income. There-
fore, taking1hese facts into question which indubitably could be taking 
275 
G 
H 
276 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[!987] l S.C.R. 
A 
into account, it cannot be said that the landlady had 'no other reason-
-~ 
B 
ably suitable accommodation'. 
Allowing the appeal, 
HELD: (I) The order and judgment of the qigh Court are set 
aside. In view of the undisputed facts that the landlady had in her 
choice to go into the premises in question but she did not, she had become 
disentitled to the right of eviction. [287 A, 286H] 
(2)(i) The Rent restriction laws are both beneficial and restric"l--( 
live, beneficial for those who want protection from eviction and rack 
c renting, but restrictive so far as the landlord's right or claim for evic· 
lion is concerned. Rent restriction laws would provide a habitat for the 
landlord or landlady if need be, but not to seek comforts other than 
) 
habitat-that right the landlord must seek elsewhere. The philosophy 
and principle of rent restriction law have nothing to do with the private 
exploitation of property by the owners of the property in derogation of 
D the tenant's need of protection from eviction in a society of shortage of 
accommodation. [285F, 286G I 
(2)(ii) Administration of justice c:lemands that any changes either 
in fact or in law must be taken cognizance of by the Court but that must 
be done in a cautious manner of relevant facts. Therefore, subsequent 
E events can be taken cognizance of if they are relevant and material. [283G] 
Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders, 
(1975] 3 SCR 958, Hasmat Rai & Anr. v. Raghunarh Prasad, [1981] 3 
SCR 605 and Variety Emporium v. V.R.M. Mohd: Ibrahim Naina, 
F 
(1985] I SCC 251, relied upon. 
r 
Firm Ram Sewa Hari Ram v. Sain Dan Mal, AIR 1%7 Delhi 113 
and Abdul Hamid and another v. Nur Mohammad, AIR 1976 Delhi 
328,approved. 
Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan and .Others etc. etc. v. State 
G of Utrar Pradesh and Others etc. etc .. [1982] 1SCC39, referred to. 
(3) In a proceeding for the ejectment of a tenant OD the ground of 
personal requirement under a statute controlling the eviction of ten-
ants, unless the statute prescribes to the contrary the requirement must 
continue to ellist OD the date when the proceedings was finally disposed 
H of either in appeal or revision by the relevant authority. [284 DI 
r 
AMARJIT SINGH v. KHA TOON QUAMARAIN (MUKHARJI, J.) 

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