LexAMARJIT KAUR versus PRITAM SINGH & OTHERS
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
A
'
B
c
0
E
F
G
•
H
AMARJIT KAUR
v.
PRITAM SINGH & OTHERS
August 6, 1974.
[A. N. RAY, C. J. AND K. K. MATHEW, J.]
605
Practice and Procedure-Nature of appeal-How far appellate Court ca1i iake
into account matters which have come into existence after the passing of the decree
appealed against.
Section 3 of the Punjab Pre-emption (Repeal) Act, )973, which came into force
·in April 1973, provides that 'on and from the date of the commencement' of the Act,
no court shall pass a decree in any pre-emption suit.
The 4th defendant sold his property to defendants I to 3 in 1965 and the plain-
tiff filed a suit claiming a right to pre-empt. The trial court and first appellate court
held in plaintiffs favour. A second appeal to the High Court was allowed, because,
by that time the Act had come into force and the High Court held that s. 3 governs
the decision.
Dismissing the appeal to this Court,
HELD : An appeal is a rehearing and in moulding the relief to be granted in a
case on appeal, the appellate Court is entitled to take into account even facts _and
events which have come into existence after the passing of the decree appealed a~ams~.
Jf the High Court were to confirm the decree allowing the suit for pre-empuon, it
would be passing a decree in a suit for pre-emption, for, when the appellate court
confirms a decree it passes a decree of its own, and therefore, the High Court was
right in allowing the appeal. [6060-F]
Lachweshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhury,
[1940] F.C.R. 84
Kristnama Chariviar v. Ma11ga1nma!, [1902J I. L. R. 26 Med. 91, at pp. 95-96,
referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeals Nos. 941, 1123,
1572, 1666, 1667, 1760, 1780 of 1973 and 8 of 1974.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated the
22nd May/31st August, 22nd May /20th September/I 7th August/
17th September, 1973 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in R. S.
As. Nos. 1095/71, 271/69, IJ/68, 879170, 899171, 2015170 and
1137 of 197l respectively.
\
D. V. Patel, V. C. Mahajan, S. S. Khanduja, Janardhan Sharma,
Ram Swarup, R. A. Gupta, Hardev Singh, Bupinder Singh, J. D. Jain,
R. C. Kohli and S. C. Patel for appellunts.
Hardyal Hardy, 0. P. Sharma, S. K. Mehta, K. R. Nagaraja, M.
Quarnaruddin and Vinod Dhawan for respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
MATHEW, J.-In these appeals, a common questioi1 of law arises
for consideration and this judgment will disporn of all the appeals.
We will take up for consideration Civil Appeal No. 941 (N) of
1973. The appellant challenges the correctness of a decree pamd by
the High Court dismissing a suit for pre-emption. The plaint property
belonged to defendant No. 4.
He sold the rnme to defendants Nos.
I to 3 by a sale deed dated July 29, 1965 and registered on October 14,
1965. The appellant who is the daughter of defendant No. 4 claiming
that she has right to pre-empt, instituted the suit through her guardian.
The trial court decreed the suit. Against the decree, an appeal was
preferred by the ~andees. That appeal was dismissed on July 17,
1971. An appeal was preferred to the High Court against this dec1ee.
606
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1975) 1 S.C.R.
The Punjab Pre-em~tion (R~poal) Act, 1973 (Act II of 1973) receiv-...d
the assent of the Governor. of Punjab on April 6, 1973 and was
published in the Punjab Gazotte on April 9, 1973. The High Court
allowJd the appeal and dismi~sed t~e suit holding that the provision
of s. 3' of the above Act should govern the decision. The plaintiff-
appdlant then applied for leave to file Letters Patent Appeal. That
was dismissed.
·
·
·
·
Section 3 of the Punjab Pre-emption (Repeal) Act, 1973, provides:
"Bar to pass decree in suit for pre-E mption....:On and from
the date of commencement of the Punjab Pre-emption (Repeal)
Act, 1973, no court shall pass a decree in any suit for pre-emption".
.B
The section, in effect, says that no court shall decree a suit fo1 pre-
em;ition after the coming into force of the Act: The question is,
C
whether the appellate court, when it passes a decree, confirming the
decree for pre-emption passed by the trial court or the lower appellate
. court, is passing a decree for pre-emption.
In Lachweshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Cluwdhury (') it
was held that once the decree passed. by a court had been appealed
against, the m1tter became sub-judice again and thereafter the appellate
court has
•eisin of the wholeExcerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.