LexAMAR SINGH versus CUSTODIAN, EVACUEE PROPERTY, PUNJAB
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S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 801 AMAR SINGH v. CUSTODIAN, EVACUEE PROPERTY, PUNJAB (BHAGWATI, jAGANNADHADAs, jAFER IMAM, GovINDA · MENON and ]. L. KAPUR JJ.) Evacuee property-Allotment-Displaced land-holders-Quasi" permanent allotment-Cancellation-Violation of Fundamental Rights-Constitution of India, Arts. 19(1)(f), 31(1), 31(2)-Admini- stration ef Ev!lcuee Property Act, 1950 (XXXI of 1950). The petitioners, who were displaced persons from Pakistan owning land therein, were also co_-sharers in a joint khata owned by some evacuees in a suburban village in East Punjab. On their displacement they were in the first instance temporarily allotted agricultural land in that village. Subsequently, a.s a result of the readjustment of allotments of the suburban land amongst the various groups who had quasi-permanent allotments therein, which had to be carried out according to certain rules and instruc- tions, the allotments of the petitioners were cancelled. The case of the petitioners was that the allotment to them was on a quasi- permanent basis and that, therefore, they had acquired certain rights in the land which constituted property, and they contended that the order cancelling the allotment was in violation of their fundamental rights to property under Arts. 19(1)(f), 31 (1) and 31 (2) of the Constitution of India. Though the petitioners were allottees of agricultural land on the basis of a quasi-permanent allotment it was admitted that they were not able to get a sanad under the rules for the lands originally allotted to them, when only they could obtain permanent property in the land. It was not disputed that the cancellation of the allotment was under the purported exercise of powers under the provisions of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, and the rules framed thereunder taken with some executive instructions. Held, that the interest of a quao;i-permanent allottee does not constitute 'property' within the meaning of Arts. 19(1)(f), 31(1) or 31 (2) of the Constitution of India, and accordingly the orders cancelling the allotments could not amount to violation of funda- mental rights under those Articles. The basic features of the interest of a quasi-permanent allottee ·are that the ultimate ownership of the land is still recognised to be that of the evacuee and the allotment itself is l~ble to resumpt!o? or ~ancellation with reference to the exigen- cies of the adm1mstration of evacuee law. The interest so "recognised is, in its essential concept, provisional though with a view to stabilisation and ultimate permanence. An interest in land owned by another in such a situation cannot be fitted into any concept of property in itself. 1957 March 290 1957 Amar Siffl~ v. Custr.Jian, ECJ(Jcutt Prop<rty, Ptajab. SUPREME COURT REPORTS . Julius v. Lord Bishop of Oxford, (188o) 5 A.C. 214, distin- guished. Property in order that it may fall within the scope of A1t. 19( 1 )(f) must be capable of being the subject matter of "acquisition and disposal". But tJ:ie interest of a quasi-permanent allottee arises by statutory grant to a person of a specified class and is not capable of being acquired by an ordinary citizen in any of the normal modes. Nor is it capable of b6ng disposed of by the allottee himself by way of sale, mortgage, gift or will. Con- sequently, Art. 19(1)(f) cannot apply to the case. In order that Art . 31 ( 1) may apply it is not enough that there is deprivation, but such deprivation must be \\-·ithout the authority of law. In the present case the quasi-permanent allotments of the petitioners were cancelled in enforcement of a right of resumption or cancellation which is an incident of such property, and hence the Article has not been infringed. The interest of a quasi-permanent allottee cannot ho brought within the scope of Art. 31(2) as it stood prior to the an1endment. The words "taking possession" or "acquisition" there are in~.ppro priate in respect of the rights which constitute quasi-permanent tt"nurc. In vie\v of the word "deemrd" occurring in Art. 31 (2A) it appears likely that the amendment to Art. 31(2) was inlenrled to be retrospective, but even then the amended Article taken w~th Art. 31 (2A) is equally inapplicable as it contemplates acquisition or requisitioning (and taking possession) as a result of transfer of the ownership or of the right to possession. Suraj Parkash Kapur v. The State of
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