AL. PR. RANGANATHAN CHETTIAR versus AL. PR. AL. PERIAKARUPPAN CHETTIAR

Citation: [1958] 1 S.C.R. 214 · Decided: 24-05-1957 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: B. JAGANNADHADAS · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

1957 -
May,24 
214 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1958] 
AL. PR. RANGANATHAN CHE1TIAR 
v. 
AL. PR. AL. PERIAKARUPPAN CHETTIAR 
(and connected appeal) 
(JAGANNADHADAS, B.P. SINHA and 
GOVINDA MENON JJ.) 
Will-Constructio~Disposition to adopted son, R-Adoption 
invalid-Whether R. takes property as persona designata. £Jeetl 
Construction-Trust, whether created-Language of deed ambi-
guous-Subsequent conduct of parties-Burden of proof 
P adopted A in 1914 but on account of the acute differences 
which arose between them later, he made a second adoption of the 
first appellant .in 1926 on the footing that such an adoption was 
permitted by special custom in Nattukottai Chetti families. Jn 
the partition suit filed by A for himself and on behalf of his minor 
son, the first respondent, the validity of the second adoption was 
challenged, but the matter was compromised by a Rajinama under 
which P was directed to pay the plaintiffs therein Rs. 75,000 each 
separately in lieu of their right to partition. Under the terms of 
. para 3 of the Rajinama and the hundi executed by P in favour of 
the first respondent, the amount was to be paid to the order of three 
persons, viz., the father and mother of the first respondent and C, 
and the amount itself was to be invested in the name of the first 
respondent in Chetti firms to the order of P and C who were to be 
in management. In 1929 P executed a will whereby he made 
arrangements for certain religious gifts and charities and gave the 
residue of the property to his ·wife for her life and thereafter t<> 
his second adopted son, the first appellant. On attaining majority 
in 1943 the first respondent filed two suits. The first was on the 
footing that the amount of Rs. 75,000 which was given to him 
under the Rajinama was constituted a trust for his benefit during 
his minority under the trusteeship of P and C, that the money 
was wrongfully appropriated by C, contrary to the terms of the 
Rajinama, and that P as a co-trustee with C was equally respon-
sible for C's breach of trust and that the first respondent was 
entitled to have the amount aid out of the estate of P in the 
hands of the appellant. The second suit was for the recovery of 
the entire properties of P on the ground that the second adoption 
was invalid and that the will executed by P was ineffective. It 
was found that the adoption of the first appellant was invalid and 
that the customary adoption set up by P was made for temporal 
rather than spiritual purposes, and the question was whether, 
notwithstanding his description as adopted son in the will in 
several places, the intention was· that he was to take the property 
as persona designata. 
As regards the terms of para 3 of the 
S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
215 
Rajinama the language used was ambiguous, whether the power 
of investment was vested in both P and C, but looking at the 
subsequent conduct of the parties it was found that it was C who 
was authorised to collect the amount of the hundi and to arrange 
for the investment of the same on the responsibility of the father 
and mother of the first respondent. 
Held : (1) The question whether a disposition to a person is 
intended as a persona designata or 'by reason of his filling a parti-
cular legal status which turns out to be invalid, depends on the 
facts of the case and the terms of the particular document con-
taining the disposition, and in the instant case, in view of the 
exclusion of the validly adopted son and his heirs from succes-
sion and the conduct of the parties for over 14 years in allowing 
the first appellant to retain the property, taking an overall picture 
of the various provisions of the will, it was clear that the first 
appellant was intended by the testator to take the property as 
persona designata and that the will was therefore effective to 
convey title to him. 
Nidhoomoni Debya v. Saroda Pershad Mookerjee, (1876) L.R. 
3 I.A. 253 and Fanindra Deb Raikat v. Rajeswar Das, (1884) L.R. 
12 I.A. 72, referred to. 
(2) Trusteeship is a position which is to be imputed to a 
person on clear and conclusive evidence of transfer of ownership 
and of the liability attached to such ownership on 
account of 
confidence reposed, and on such liability having been accepted by 
the alleged trustee, and in the present case there was no proof 
that P became a trustee for the minor's fund and incurred liability 
for C's breach of trust. 
CIVIL, APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 
104 o

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