AKBAR BADRUDIN JIWANI versus COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, BOMBAY

Citation: [1990] 1 S.C.R. 369 · Decided: 14-02-1990 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: B.C. RAY · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 3 judgment(s) · cites 3 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

AKBAR BADRUDIN JIWANI 
A 
v. 
COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, BOMBAY 
FEBRUARY 14, 1990. 
[B.C. RAY AND S. RATNAVEL PANDIAN, JJ.] 
B 
Customs Act, 1962: Sections lll(d), 112 and 125-Calcareous 
stone imported by appellant-Whether 'marble' under Import & Export 
Policy April 1988-March 1991 Entry 62, Appendix 2, Part B-
Whether can be confiscated on that ground-Whether option to clear 
goods for home consumption on payment of fine valid: the term .'mar-
C 
ble' to be interpreted in a manner which is in consonance with the 
statutory context and not as u.•derstood in commercial parlance. 
The appellant on behalf of his firm, which is engaged in proces-
sing of stone slabs, placed an order for calcareous stone (other than 
marble) with the exporter in Italy, and asked the exporter to certify that D 
the said goods were not marble. The appellant further obtained from 
the foreign exporter a sample tile and had the same tested by a reputed 
geologist who confirmed that the sample was not marble. The goods 
were imported under OGL Appendix 6, Item I of Import and Export 
Policy for April 1988-March 1991. 
E 
The Customs Department sent sealed samples of the imported 
goods for testing to various technical authorities, and on the basis of 
some of these reports/opinions/visual observations issued a show cause 
notice to the appellant alleging that the calcareous stone were nothing . 
but marble only as per the commercial definition of marble and there-
fore governed by Entry 62, Appendix 2, Part B of the Import & Export 
F 
Policy for March 1988-1991. In reply the appellant's contention was 
that the said goods could not be regarded as 'marble' in terms of the 
expression 'marble' appearing in heading 25.15 in Schedule l, 
Appendix 1-B, Customs Tariff Amendment Act, 1985. 
The Collector of Customs however passed an order that the goods 
G 
imported were marble requiring a specific import licence. The 
Collector further ordered confiscation of the goods and imposition of 
fine and penalty. The Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate 
Tribunal dismissed the appellant's appeal but reduced the penalty 
amount. 
H 
369 
A 
B 
c 
370 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1990] I S.C.R. 
Before this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that: 
(1) for the purpose of understanding the meaning of 'marble' 
occurring in Appendix 1-B, Schedule I of the Imports (Control) Order, 
1955 it is necessary to refer to Mineral Products, in Chapter 25, Tariff 
Entry No. 25.15. 
(2) the term 'marble' therein dues nut occur by itself or in isola-
tion but as an inseverable part of a Tariff Entry which deals with five 
.>....
items (a) Marble (b) Travertine (c) Ecaussine (d) Other calcareous stone 
and ( e) Alabaster; 
( 3) the Tariff Entry draws a clear line of distinction between each 
of these five items and regards them as five distinct products; 
(4) the term 'marble' has to be given a meaning which fits in and 
harmonises in the above mentioned statutory context, so that 'marble' 
-r 
continues to remain distinct and different from the said other four 
D 
items; 
(5) though the general principle of interpretation of tariff entries 
occurring in a tax statute is th•t of commercial nomenclature or under-
standing in the trade, the said doctrine or commercial nomenclature or 
A 
trade understanding can and should be departed from in a case where 
E 
the statutory context in which the tariff item appears, requires such a 
departure; 
F 
(6) the principles of interpretation are never embodied rules and 
~ 
the same must always yield to the context of the particular statute; 
J
(7) as the word 'marble' has not been defined and the tariff item 
refers to calcareous stone of an apparent specific gravity of 2.5 or more, 
it has to be taken to be used in a technical and scientific sense and as 
such the sa1ne cannot be interpreted in the popular commercial sense; 
(8) the end-use of the particular product is irrelevant and of no 
G 
consequen~e for determining its classification; and 
H 
(9) if the term 'marble' is to be given the commercial meaning as 
relied upon by the Customs Authorities then the inevitable consequence 
would be that the term 'marble' in Chapter Heading 25.15 would auto-
matically include within it the other four items thereby rendering the 
rest of the Tariff Entry otiose, redundant and meaningless. 
r 
1 
AKBAR v. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS 
371 
On behalf of the Revenne it was contended that: 
A 
(1) the word 'marble' has not been defined 

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