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AJIT SINGH versus STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR

Citation: [1967] 2 S.C.R. 143 · Decided: 02-12-1966 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K. SUBBA RAO · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
c 
D 
F 
G 
H 
,\JIT SINGH 
v. 
STA'.f.E OF PUNJAB & ANR. 
December 2, 1966 
[K. SUBBA RAO, C.J. M. HIDAYATULLAH, S. M, S!KRI, 
R. S. BACHAWAT AND J. M. SHELAT, JJ.j 
Retrospeclivity-Public Officer-Retrospective appointment by l'/01i/i· 
cation-Acts dpne before date of Notification, if valid. 
Constitution of India, 1950, Arr. 3 lA ( 1), Second proviso-"Acquisi-
tiOn .by Statti', meaning of. 
E:P.st Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmenta-
tion) Act (SO of 1948)--Scheme under-Small portion 
of land taken 
from proprietor holding land within ceiling limit-Pr }rietor, if entitled 
10 compensation. 
Between May 1961, and May 1962, consolidation proceedings were 
taken under the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of 
Fragmentation) Act, 1948, in an estate in which the appellant was a small 
proprietor llolding land within the ceiling liiµit. 
The scheme for Cl>n· 
solidation provided for taking of a fraotion of each proprietor's land and 
throwing into a common pool which was added to the land already in 
the possession of the Gram Panchayat. 
But no portion of the common 
pool apart from what was already owned by the Panchayat, was reserved 
for providing income to the Panchayat. The ownership of the common 
pool was to vest in the proprietary body consisting of the several pro-
prietors, and the Gram Panchayat was 
to manage 
and use it for the 
common needs and benefits of the estate, under r. 16(ii) of the Punjab 
Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Rules, 1949; 
so that, Che proprietor J and non-proprietors would share in the benefits. 
The appellan: filed a writ petition in 1965, contending that: (I) 
The 
ConsoLdation Officer was not appointed till after the repartition was CtJn-
cluded, that. he eould not be appointed 
retrospectively, that he had no 
legal authority when he commenced the proceedings, and therefore,_ the 
scheme was invalid; and (2) the scheme amounted to "acquisition by the 
State" within the meaning of the second proviso to Art. 31A(J) of the 
Constitution, with the result· that compensation to the proprietor at 
the 
market rate was payable. The High Court di.,missed the petition. 
On appeal, 
HELD: (Per SubiJa Rao. C. J., Sik1i and Bachawat 
JJ.) (1) 
The 
Consolidation Officer haU no authority to act as such before he was ap-
poin:ed and what he did, ·purporting to act as such officer, had no bind-
ing effect on the ownecs. 
Further, 
the State Government could not 
appoint him and clothe him with authority re:rospectively. 
But, as the 
appellant was guilty of Jaches and no manifest injustice was done to him~ 
the High Court was right in rejec·ing the contention. [147 B-D] 
(Per Hidayatullah and Shela!, JJ.) : A> the petition w.- filed more 
lhan three years after the compJet:on of the repartition of holding5. the. 
contention should not be entertained in the face of the presUmption urder 
s. 114. Indian Evidence Act, nan1ely. 
that the Officer 
must have been 
appointed to act as such, as without such appointment he would not have 
acted. [154 BJ 
144 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1967] 2 S.C.R. 
(2) (Per Subba Rao, C. J. S1kri and 
llachawat, 
JJ.). The word' 
"acquisition hy the State" in the second proviso to Art. 3 IA(I) do not 
have any technical meaning. 
In the cont-.t of Art. 31A the e•pression 
must have the same meaning as it bas in Art. 3 IA( I )(a). The essential 
difference between "acquisition by the State" on the one band and "modifi-
cation or extinguishment of ri$hts" on the other, is that in the first case 
the beneficiary is the State wbde in the second the beneficiary is not the 
State. Therefore, if the State has in substance acquired all the rights in 
the land tor its own pu'l"'ses, even if the title remains with the owner, 
it canno1 be said that it 1s not acquisilion within !he proviso. [149 B-D; 
150 G] 
Start of Wtst Btngal v. Subodh Gopal 
Bose 
[1954] 
S.C.R. 
581, 
Dwarkadas Shriniwas v. TM Sho/apur Spinning and 
Weaving Co. Ltd., 
(1954] S.C.R. 674, Sagh/r Ahmad v. State of U.P. [1955] I S.C.R. 
707 
and Bombay Dyeing and Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Statt of Bombay, [1958] S.C.R. 
1122, followed. 
But on the facts of this case, the beneficiary of the modification ol 
rights was neither the State nor the Panchayat; and therefore, there was 
no acquisition by the State within the second proviso. 
As a result of 
the scbe11Je the tille to the small fraction of land wLich was taken away 
for forming lhe common pool re

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