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AJAIB SINGH versus GURBAX SINGH & ORS.

Citation: [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1099 · Decided: 17-11-1987 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: SABYASACHI MUKHERJI · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

!>-
AJAIB SINGH 
A 
v. 
GURBAX SINGH & ORS. 
NOVEMBER 17, 1987 
[SABYASACHI MUKHARJI AND G.L. OZA, JJ.) 
B 
Indian Contract Act, 1872: Agreement of sal~Specific perform-
ance of-Major portion of sale price paid by buyer-Possession of 
property with buyer in part performance of agreement-Documents of 
title not executed-Limitation bar pleaded-Held High Court erred in 
denying specific performance on account of hardship without deciding C 
whether claim was barred by limitation. 
Under an agreement of sale entered into by respondents the appel-
lant had paid the major portion of the agreed price long time ago and 
the balance thereof that was to be paid at the time of execution of the 
documents was a sum of Rs. 7 5 only. Possession of the premises was with D 
the' appellant for all these years in part performance of the agreement. 
Upon failure of the respondents to execute documents of title, the 
appellant sought specific performance of the agreement. The respon-
dents canvassed the question of limitation before the High Court. The 
High Court, however, without deciding that question took the view that E 
due to passage of time prices of lands had gone up sky high and it would 
be unjust to enforce the agreement of sale. 
Allowing the appeal by special leave, 
HELD: The High Court exercised discretion on wrong principles. F 
Without deciding the question whether the claim of the plaintiff was 
barred by limitation or not it proceeded to refuse to grant the relief on 
the ground that there has been good deal of delay and the parties would 
suffer if specific performance of the agreement was granted. This 
principle was not applicable to the facts of the case and the exercise of 
discretion was not proper. The matter remanded to the High Court for G 
decision in merits. [UOOG; E; llOlB) 
Madamsetty Satyanarayana v. G. Yellogi Rao & Ors., [1965) 2 
SCR 221; Dr. Jiwan Lal & Ors. v. Brij Mohan Mehra & Anr., [1973] 2 
SCR 230 and Debendra Nath Manda! v. Sakhilal Kar & Ors., AIR 1950 
Calcutta 526, referred to. 
H 
1099 
I 100 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[ !988] I S.C.R. 
A 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3066 
f-
of 1987. 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
From the Judgment and Order dated 9.7.1986 of the Punjab and 
Haryana High Court in R.S. A. No. 163 of 1978. 
Mala Ram Ghana and Dalveer Bhandari for the Appellant. 
M.S. Gujral and Dr. Meera Aggarwal for the Respondents. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. Special leave granted. 
The High Court in its judgment and order dated 9th July, 1986, 
has observed that the question of limitation has been canvassed before 
the High Court. The High Court expressed the view that there was a 
lot of conflict between the various High Courts on the interpretation of 
Article 54 of the Limitation Act which governed the point of limita-
tion. The High Court, however, did not decide this question and 
expressed the view that due to passage of time prices of lands had gone 
up sky-high and it would be unjust to enforce the agreement of sale 
entered into. In other words, it appears that without deciding the 
question whether the claim of the plaintiff was barred by limitation or 
not, the High Court exercised its discretion in refusing to grant theΒ· 
relief on the ground that there has been good deal of delay and the 
parties would suffer if specific performance of the agreement was 
granted. It appears from the facts that in this case the major portion of 
the agreed price had been paid long time-ago and the balance thereof 
was to be paid at the time of execution of the documents was a sum of 
Rs. 75 only. It further appears that possession of the premises was with 
the appellant for all these years in part performance of the agreement. 
In those circumstances, the principle upon which the High Court re-
fused to exercise its discretion, in our opi,nion, was not applicable and 
such discretion was not proper. The High Court exercised discretion 
on wrong principles. See in this connection M.adamsetty Satyanarayana 
v. G. Yellogi Rao & Two others, [1965] 2 SCR 221; Dr. Jiwan Lal & 
Ors. v. Brij Mohan Mehra & Another, [1973] 2 SCR 230 and see also 
the observation in Debendra Nath Manda/ v. Sakhilal Kar & Ors., 
AIR 1950 Calcutta 526. 
In that view of the matter, we cannot sustain the exercise of 
discretion in the manner done by the High Court. This, however, does 
't 
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AJAJil SINGH v. GURBAX SINGH (MUKHARJI, J.] 
1101 
not deci

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