AISHWARYA ATUL PUSALKAR versus MAHARASHTRA HOUSING & AREA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS.
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A B C D E F G H 342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 6 S.C.R. AISHWARYA ATUL PUSALKAR v. MAHARASHTRA HOUSING & AREA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 7231 of 2012) APRIL 27, 2020 [DEEPAK GUPTA AND ANIRUDDHA BOSE, JJ.] Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 – ss.2(25), 79, 95A and 177 – Family property of respondent no.8- husband was redeveloped – During redevelopment, occupants thereof shifted to temporary accommodation as required, appellant-wife did not – She shifted on the order of High Court passed in matrimonial proceeding pending between the parties – In parallel developments pertaining thereto, the decree of judicial separation granted to respondent no.8 was set aside – Plea for divorce, dismissed – Appellant filed writ petition inter alia for directions to MHADA to rehouse her in the two flats allocated to respondent no.8 and his family in the redeveloped building, which as per her is her matrimonial home – Dismissed – Held: When a builder has discharged his obligation by accommodating the original owners in the redeveloped portion as per such a scheme, a lady married into that family is not entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction of High Court to enforce her right to matrimonial home on the basis of said statute, if her husband does not permit her to reside in the allocated portion – Though appellant was dishoused as an occupier applying the provisions of 1976 Act, claim of her rehousing is based on her status as respondent no.8’s wife – As of now, the decree of judicial separation stands invalidated and she is the legally wedded wife of respondent no.8 – However, the original building that constituted her matrimonial home has been demolished and large portions of the redeveloped building on the same plot has been parted with – Traditionally, her matrimonial home at present would be the premises in which her husband is residing – Judicial forum having fact-finding jurisdiction would be the proper forum for adjudicating claim of this nature – Further, respondent no.8 and the builder uniformly stated that a flat in the same building is available to accommodate the appellant – Dispute pending for very long, [2020] 6 S.C.R. 342 342 A B C D E F G H 343 directions issued u/Art.142 – Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 – Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. Disposing of the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1 The position as it stands now is that the decree of judicial separation stands invalidated and as of now, the appellant is the legally wedded wife of the respondent no.8. She has been out of her matrimonial home since the year 2000. But such right cannot be enforced invoking the writ jurisdiction. Moreover, the original building that constituted her matrimonial home has been demolished. Large portions of the redeveloped building on the same plot has been parted with. Now going by its traditional meaning, her matrimonial home at present would be the premises in which her husband is residing. In this complex perspective, a judicial forum having fact-finding jurisdiction would be the proper forum for adjudicating her claim of this nature. The appellant drew attention to Section 177 of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 to contend that disputes arising out of the said Act cannot be adjudicated upon by a Civil Court. But, the dispute raised by her does not arise out of any of the provisions of the 1976 Act. Though she was dishoused as an occupier applying the provisions of the 1976 Act, claim of her rehousing is based on her status as wife of the respondent no. 8. Such claim has to be adjudicated upon by the Civil Court or the Family Court or any other forum the law may prescribe. Such right of the appellant cannot be diffused with the right of her husband under the 1976 Act, whose family property, part of which he is the owner, has been reconstructed. [Para 11][353-C-F] 1.2 The Bombay High Court has in substance non-suited her on the ground that the Writ Court was not the appropriate forum for granting her relief. The Court does not per se find any error in such approach. But, in course of this appeal, the husband (respondent no. 8) has filed an affidavit stating that he has set apart the Flat No. 101 in which the appellant could be accommodated. The appellant on the other hand has asserted that the allocation of the same flat was earmarked for one Mr. Nayak Satam, a tenant, as per the plan. Considering the fact that the dispute is pending for a very long ti
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