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AHMEDABAD WOMEN ACTION GROUP AND ORS. ETC. versus UNION OF INDIA

Citation: [1997] 2 S.C.R. 389 · Decided: 24-02-1997 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: A.M. AHMADI · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 2 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

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Judgment (excerpt)

' --
AHMEDABAD WOMEN ACTION GROUP AND ORS. ETC. 
A 
v. 
UNION OF INDIA 
FEBRUARY 24, 1997 
[A.M. AHMADI, C.J., SlJJATA V. MANOHAR AND 
K. VENKATASWAMI, JJ.] 
Constitution of India-Articles 13, 14, 15 and 32--Scope of-Power of 
the Court-Legislative policy relating to personal laws-interference ,by 
B 
couns-Extent of-Personal Laws. 
C 
Three writ petitions were filed by different organisations under 
Article 32 of the Constitution of India as public interest litigation, The 
Ahmedabad Women Action Group prayed for the follo~ing reliefs in its 
writ petition :-
(a) to declare Muslim Personal Law which allows polygamy as void 
offending Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution; 
(b) to describe Muslim Personal Law which enables a Muslim male 
D 
to give unilateral Talaq to his ~ife mthout her consent and mthout resort E 
to judicial process of courts, as void, offending Articles 13, 14 and 15 of 
the Constitution. 
(c) to declare that the mere fact that a Muslim husband takes more 
than one mfe is an act of cruelty mthin the meaning of Clause VIII (I} of 
Section 2 of Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939. 
(d) to declare that Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) 
Act, 1986 is void infringing Articles 14 and 15. 
F 
(e) to further declare that the provisions of Sunni and Shia laws of G 
inheritance which discriminate against females in their share as compared 
to the share of males of the same status, void as discriminating against 
females only on the ground of sex. 
In the Writ petition filed by Lok Sewak Sangh, the follomng reliefs 
were prayed for:-
389 
H 
390 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(1997] 2 S.C.R. 
A 
(a) to declare Sections 2(2), 5(ii) & (iii), 6 and Explanation to 
B 
c 
D 
Section 30 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956, as void offending Articles 14 and 
15 read with Article 13 of the Constitutilln of India; 
(b) to declare Section (2) of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, as void 
offending Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India; 
(c) to declare Sections 3(2), 6 and 9 of Hindu Minority and Guar· 
dianship Act read with Sections 6 of Guardians and Wards Act as void; 
( d) to declare the unfettered and absolute discretion allowed to a 
Hindu spouse to make testamentary disposition without providing for an 
ascertained share of his or her spouse and dependent, void. 
Similarly in their writ petition, the Young Women Christian As· 
sociation sought for a declaration that Section 10 and 34 of Indian Divorce 
Act and Sections 43 to 48 of Indian Succession Act are void. 
Dismissing the writ petitions, this Court 
HELD : 1.1. The Legislature is responsible for the welfare of the 
State and it is for them to lay down the policy that the State should pursue. 
Therefore, it is for them to determine what legislation to put up on the 
E statute book in order to advance the welfare of the State. The Courts are 
not concerned with the proprietory of their views or their wisdom. [395-F] 
F 
1.2. The Courts can at best advise and focus attention on the State 
policy on the problem and shake it from its slumber, goading it to awaken, 
march and reach the goal. For, in whatever measure be the concern of the 
court, it compulsively needs to apply, somewhere and at sometime, breaks 
to its self-motion, described in judicial parlance as self-restraint. 
Maharslzi Avadhcsh v. Union of India, [1994] Supp. 1 SCC 715; 
Reynold Rajamani & Anr. v. Union of India & Anr., [1982] 2 SCC 474; 
G Pannalal Bansilal & Ors. v. State of A.P. & Anr., [1996] 2 SCC 498 and 
Madhu Kishwar & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors., [1996) 5 SCC 125, relied 
on. 
2. The Constitution of India itself recognises the existence of per· 
sonal laws in terms when it deals with the topic falling under personal Jaw 
H in item 5 in the Concurrent List-List Ill. Yet the framers of the Constitu-
< 
AHMEDABAD WOMEN ACTIONv. U.O.I. [VENKATASWAMI,J.] 391 
tion did not wish that the provisions or the personal laws should be A 
challenged by reason of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part Ill of 
the Constitution and so they did not intend to include these personal laws 
within the definition of the expression "laws in force." Therefore, the 
personal laws do not fall within Article 13(1) at all. [399-D-G] 
State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali, AIR (1952) Born. 84, cited. 
B 
Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir & Ors., AIR (1980) SC 707, relied on. 
Sar/a Mudgal & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [1995) 3 SCC 635, 
distinguished. 
3. There is no substance in the challenge by the

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