AFZAL ULLAH versus THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

Citation: [1964] 4 S.C.R. 991 · Decided: 20-09-1963 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 10 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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4S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
held that the provisiom of s. 417(4) were a 'special law' 
within the meaning of s. 29(2) of the Limitation Act. In 
that case, the High Court has dealt with the decisions of the 
different High Courts on the question and with the reason-
ings for those decisions. As we agree with the conclusions of 
the High Court of Bombay, we do not think it necessary to 
repeat the observations made therein, bearing on the reasons 
given by the High Courts of Albhaba<l, Andhra Pradesh 
and Madras for coming to contrary conclusions. 
For the reasons given above, we hold that the view taken 
by the High Court of Punjab is entirely correct. The appeal 
is accordingly dismissed. 
Appelll dismismJ. 
AFZAL ULLAH 
"· 
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SuBBA RAO, K. N. WAN"cHoo, 
J. C. SHAH AND RAGHTJBAR DAYAL, JJ.) 
U•ited Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916 (No. II of 1916), 
ss. 298. 299(1) and bye-law cl. 3(a)--.!'Markd' meaning of-
1-V !tether bye-lau1 ultra vires. 
The appellant-accused was charged \Vith committing the off~nu 
under s. 299(1) of the United Provinces Municipalities Act, read 
with cl. 3(a) of the relevant bye-laws framed by Respondent No. 
2. 
The case against the appellant was that he was running a 
n1arket \Vithin the municipal area in which Yegetables, fruit•, fish 
and grains were sold. 
It was alleged that he was bound to take 
a licence for the aforesaid market under cl. 3(a) of the rdevant 
bye-laws and since he had failed to do so, he had committed • 
breach of the said bye-laws. 
He was tried by the Tchsildar of 
Tanda on the said charge. The Tehsildar acquitted him. The Teh-
sildar held that he was running only a grain market and Respon-
dent No. 2 (the Municipality) had no power to make bye-laws for 
the running of a purely grain market and so the in1pugned bye~ 
laws were ultrQ vireJ', 
On appeal, the High Court set a~ide- the 
order of acquittal and com·icted the appellant under s. 299( I) of 
the Act read with cl. 3(a) of the relevant byo-laws, 
It has ~ 
65-2 S C lndia/64 
K•u1halyfl &mi 
v, 
Gop.J Si"fll 
Sinha, C, /. 
' 
1963 
1%3 
Afzal Ullah · 
v. 
The.Stllk of 
Uttar Pradesh 
992 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
l1964] 
found by both courts below in the present case that on the plot 
belonging to the appellant, more than four shops are kept and they 
sell food grains. 
HELD: (i) These shops standing on the plot of the appellant 
constitute a market within bye-law 3(a). 
(ii) There is no substance in the contention that the impugned 
bye-law 3(a) is invalid "because it is inconsistent with s. HI(!) of 
the Act. There is no justification for adding the word "only" to 
the last part of s. 241(1) of the Act. If the word "only" cannot be 
added to the said section, then it must follow that in addition to 
the bye-laws made under heading F to s. 298, the Board may make 
other bye-laws in respect of the markets falling within the purview 
of s. 241(1), provided, of course, the said bye-laws arc otherwise 
valid under ~ 298. 
(iii) St.1ion 241(1) docs not apply to the market which is run 
on the appellant's plot because it is a market for sale of grains. 
(iv) There can be no doubt that cl. (d) of s. 298(2)(F) of 
the Act conferred power on tespondcnt No. 2 to make a bye-law 
in regard to the establishment, regulation, and inspection of the 
market such as is run on the plot belonging to the appellant. If 
cl. (cl) is held to justify the making of the impugned bye-law 3(a), 
the other clauses which prescribe the procedure for the application 
of licences, their grant and other incidental matters would be valid 
under cl. (dd) of s. 298(2)(F) of the Act. Therefore, there is 
no doubt that the impugned bye-law 3(a) and the other cognate 
bye-laws are justified by els. (d) and (dd) of s. 298(2)(F) of the 
Act. 
( v) It is now well-settled that the specific provisions such as 
arc contained in the several clauses of s. 298(2) are merely illus-
trative and they cannot be read as restrictive of the generality 
of powers prescribed by s. 298(1). 
If the impugned bye-laws 
come within the purview of s. 298( 1) of the Act, it cannot be said 
that the powers enumerated under s. 298(2) control the general 
words used· by s. 298(1). 
The impugned bye-laws in regard to the markets framed by 
respondent No. 2 are for the furtherance of municipal administra-
tion under the Act, and so, would attract the provisions. of s. 
298(1). 
Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji & Ors., A.LR. 1945

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