LexACHARAYA MAHARAJSHRI NARANDRAPRASADJI ANANDPRASADJI MAHARAJ ETC. ETC. versus THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
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A 317 ACHARA YA MAHARAJSHRI NARANDRAPRASADil ANAND· PR,ASADJI MAHARAJ ETC. ETC. v. THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. October 3, 1974 B (A. N. RAY, C.J., M. H. BEG, A. ALAOIRISWAMI, P. K. GosWAMJ, AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.J . . . . c D E G H Constitution of Indio, 1950-Article 26, 31 .(2)-Rlght to compulsorily qrlire · 1roperty of religious denomination-Scope of right under Article 26(c). Constitution of India, 1950-Artlcle 31 A-Gujarat Devaathan lnama Abolitioll Act, 1969-lj entitled to the protection of Article 31A. . The Gujarat Legislature enacted Gujarat Devasthan Inamq Abolition Act, 1969. Section S of t1'c Act provides for abolition of certain Devasthan ll\81115 together with their incidents and makes Devasthan lands liable to pa~t of land revenue. Section 8 vests all public roads, lanes, tracks, bridges, ditches. dikea and fences etc., situated in Devasthan lands in Government and further provides that all rights held by an Inamdar in such property would be deemed to have been cztinguished. Section 9 of the Act provides for compensation in the form of cash annuity. By Section 31 certain exemptions granted to the Devasthan lands by the Bombay Tenancy & Agricultural Lands Act, .1948 and Gujarat Agricultural La11ds Ceiling Act 1960 have been deleted. It was contended by the appellants that the Act violated Article 26(c) of the Constitution since it deprived religious denominations of their ownership of pro. perty; that in. addition to fulfilling the _requirements of Article 31(2) the Act had to fulfil the reqwrements of Article 26(c) also; that the Act was not saved by the prov!· tions of Article 31A since the operation of Article 26(c) is not included in the former Article and that Section 31 of the Act is violative of Article 26(c) since tho compcn· 'ation available to religious denominations is grossly inadequate. Held: Article 26 guarantees the right to own and a~uire movable and im· movable property for managing religious affairs. This right cannot take away the right of the State to compulsorily acquire property in accordance with the provi· liions of Article 31(2). If the acquisition of property of a religious denomination· by the State can be proved to be such as to de~troy or completely negative it~ right to own or acquire movable and immovable property for even the survival of a reli· aious institution the question may have to be examined in a different light. How· ever, such an allegation is not made in the present appeals. When the property is acquired by the State in accordance with tlfe provisions of Article 31(2) and the acquisition cannot be iwailed on any valid ground, the right to own that property Vanishes as that right is transferred :o the State. There is no conflict between Article 26 and Article 31. The court also negatived the contel'tion of the appellants thllf the decision in Khaja Mian Wakf Estate [1971) 2 S.C.R. 790 has been over-ruled by the Bank Nationalisation case [1970] 3 S.C.R. 530. [327 C-E) The Act is pmed in furtherance of agrarian reform and is fairly protected under the saving provision of Article 31A. The right conferred under Article 26(r) is not absolute and unqualified right. . No rights in an organjsed-society can. be absolute. Where in a free play of social forces it.is not possible to bfing about a voluntary harmony, the State has to step in to set right the imbalance between com· poting interests and' there the Directive Principles of State Policy, although not enforceable in courts, have a definite and positive role introducing an obliglltiQn upon the State under Article 3 7 in making laws to regulate the conduct 'or - 1111d their affairs. In. doing so. a distinction will have to be made between t~an 'llhich directly infringe the fr=dom of reliaion and othm, although illdircctly. • · iD1 ir.>me -iar activities or reliaic>us institutions or_ bOdiea.. The core or . is 11ot interfered with ill providi.lla fer amllllitial for Slllf. bf any tlnd. 'l1le 318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1975] 2 s.c.R. Act does not violate the rights guaranteed under Article 26(c). The Act does not A make any inroad in such a way as to affect directly the substance of the right con- ~erred by Article 26(c). One fundamental right of a person may have to co-exist Ill harmony with the exercise of another fundamental right by others and also with reasonable and valid exercise of power by the State in the light of the Directive Principl
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