ABID-UL-ISLAM versus INDER SAIN DUA

Citation: [2022] 2 S.C.R. 1016 · Decided: 07-04-2022 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: SANJAY KISHAN KAUL · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2022] 2 S.C.R.
[2022] 2 S.C.R. 1016
1016
ABID-UL-ISLAM
v.
INDER SAIN DUA
(Civil Appeal No. 9444 of 2016)
APRIL 07, 2022
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL AND M. M. SUNDRESH, JJ.]
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: s.25B(8), proviso – Revisional
Power of the High Court of Delhi – Scope and ambit of – In the
instant case, appellant (landlord) filed eviction petition u/s.14(1)(e)
r/w s.25B of the Act – Respondent (tenant) unsuccessfully filed an
application before Rent Controller for leave to defend u/s.25B(5)
of the Act – Respondent approached High Court by invoking the
revisional power provided under proviso to s.25B(8), which was
allowed on the premise that there are triable issues – On appeal,
held: Proviso to s.25B(8) creates an embargo by not providing an
appeal against the order passed by the Rent Controller over an
application filed u/s.25B(5) – The intent of the legislature is to remove
the appellate remedy and thereafter a second appeal – It gives the
High Court exclusive power of revision against an order of Rent
Controller in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court
on the decision making process – Thus, High Court is not expected
to substitute and supplant its views with that of the trial Court – Its
role is to just satisfy itself on the process adopted – The scope of
interference by the High Court is very restrictive except in cases
where there is an error apparent on the face of the record – In the
instant case, High Court proceeded to allow the revision by treating
it like an appeal – Approach of High Court not sustainable in the
eye of law.
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: s.14(1)(e) – Bona fide
requirement by landlord – U/s.14(1)(e) landlord makes an application
seeking possession of the tenanted premise for his bona fide
requirement when there is no other reasonably suitable
accommodation – There has to be satisfaction on two grounds,
namely, (i) the requirement being bona fide and (ii) the non-
availability of a reasonably suitable residential accommodation –
Such reasonableness along with suitability is to be seen from the
perspective of the landlord and not the tenant.
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Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: s.14(1)(e) vis-a-vis s.25B(5) –
Scope of – For availing leave to defend u/s.25B(5), a mere assertion
per se would not suffice as s.14(1)(e) creates a presumption subject
to the satisfaction of the Rent Controller qua bona fide need in
favour of the landlord – Before a presumption is drawn, landlord is
duty bound to place prima facie material supported by the adequate
averments – It is only thereafter, the presumption gets attracted and
the onus shifts on the tenant – Further, s.19 of the Act gives a right
to the dispossessed tenant for repossession if there is a non-
compliance on the part of the landlord albeit after eviction – Such
a right is available only to a tenant who stood dispossessed on the
application filed by the landlord invoking s.14(1)(e) being allowed.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. Section 14(1)(e) carves out an exception to the
regular mode of eviction. Thus, in a case where a landlord makes
an application seeking possession of the tenanted premises for
his bona fide requirement, the Rent Controller may dispense with
the protection prescribed under the Act and then grant an order
of eviction. Requirement is the existence of bona fide need, when
there is no other “reasonably suitable accommodation”. When
the Rent Controller comes to the conclusion that there exists a
bona fide need coupled with the satisfaction that there is no
reasonably suitable residential accommodation, the twin
conditions mandated under Section 14(1)(e) stand satisfied. [Para
12][1025-D-F]
2. For availing the leave to defend as envisaged under
Section 25B(5), a mere assertion per se would not suffice as
Section 14(1)(e) creates a presumption subject to the satisfaction
of the Rent Controller qua bona fide need in favour of the landlord
which is obviously rebuttable with some material of substance to
the extent of raising a triable issue. The satisfaction of the Rent
Controller in deciding on an application seeking leave to defend
is obviously subjective. The degree of probability is one of
preponderance forming the subjective satisfaction of the Rent
Controller. Thus, the quality of adjudication is between a mere
moonshine and adequate material and evidence meant for the
rejection of a normal application for eviction. [Para 15][1029-A-C]
ABID-UL-ISLAM v

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