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ABDULLABHAI M. BHAGAT, ETC. versus THE INCOME-TAX OFFICER, SPECIAL CIRCLE, MADRAS

Citation: [1962] 1 S.C.R. 512 · Decided: 22-03-1961 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

March zz. 
512 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
ABDULLABHAI M. BHAGAT, ETC. 
v. 
[1962] 
THE INCOME-TAX OEFICER, SPECIAL CIRCLE, 
MADRAS 
(S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR, M. HIDAYATULLAH, J. c. 
SHAH and T. L. VENKATARAMA AIYAR, JJ.) 
Income Tax-Surcharge-"Federal purposes" and "for the 
purposes of the Central Government", Meaning of-Finance Act, 
1942 (XII of 1942), s. 8(1)-Government of India Act, 1935 (25 
and 26 Geo. V. Ch. 42), ss. IOO, 124(1), I38(1) Proviso (b), 313, 
Seventh Schedule item 54, List I, General Clauses Act, I897 (IO of 
r897), ss. 3(8ab) (a), r8a. 
The petitioners as partners of a registered firm were assess-
ed to income-tax for the relevant assessment years. Thereafter 
they made a disclosure of their income nnder a "Voluntary Dis-
closure Scheme" regarding profits which had escaped assess-
ment, and on reassessment of the disclosed income income-tax, 
super-tax and surcharge were levied. The levy of surcharge but 
not income-tax and super-tax was challenged as unauth'Orised. 
Held, that the power to legislate for levy of tax on income 
was conferred upon the Federal Legislature by s. 100 sub-ss. 
(1) and (2) of the Government of India Act, 1935, and item 54 
of List I of the Seventh Schedule and the Federal Legislature 
was competent under that entry to legislate in regard to the levy 
of a surcharge on tax; s. 138(1) proviso (b) did not restrict the 
amplitude of that legislative power. The term "Federal pur-
poses" in s. 138 is not defined in the Government of India Act 
nor in the General Clauses Act; but there is sufficient indication 
in the section itself that surcharges were to form part of the 
Revenues of the Federation and such Revenues were to be 
expended for the purposes therein mentioned. The concept of the 
words "purposes of the Central Government" under the General 
Clauses Act was not different from what was intended by the 
use of the words "Federal purposes" ins. 138(1) proviso (b) of 
the Government of India Act. 
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petitions Nos. 140 and 
177 to 191 of 1959. 
Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of 
India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights. 
M. R. M. Abdul Karim and K. R. Choudhury, for 
petitioners. 
K. N. Rajagopala Sastri and D. Gupta, for respon-
dents. 
• 
• 
• 
' 
' 
• 
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
513 
1961. March 22. 
The Judgment of the Court was 
delivered by 
KAPUR, J.-These are sixteen petitions under Art. 
32 of the Constitution challenging the legality of the 
imposition of surcharge imposed on the income of the 
assessees under the Finance Acts of 1942, 1943, 1944 
and 1945. 
The assessment relates to four assessment 
years 1942-43, 1943-44, 1944-45 and 1945-46. 
The petitioners are four partners of a firm named 
Mohammedaly Sarafaly & Co., Madras, which was 
carrying on business in hardware, stocks, shares, etc. 
For the assessment years 1942-43 to 1945-46 this firm 
was treated as a registered firm under the Indian 
Income-tax Act and therefore the partners were asses-
sed on their respective shares of the profits from the 
business of the firm. 
All assessments were completed 
before 1949 and total income for the purpose of as-
sessment for those four years was about Rs. 29,00,000. 
In 1955 the petitioners under a 'Voluntary Disclosure 
Scheme' with regard to profits which had escaped 
assessment made a disclosure of their income and 
proceedings were taken under s. 34 of the Income-tax 
Act. In the month of April, 1959, there was a re-
assessment on all the four partners and the total in-
come for the four assessment years thus came to 
about Rs. 35 lakhs which included Rs. 29 lakhs already 
assessed. On that income, income-tax, super-tax, and 
surcharge were levied. The surcharge, according to 
the petition was Rs. 3,82,791. It is this surcharge 
which is impugned as being without the authority of 
law inasmuch as the then Federal Legislature, it is 
submitted, was not competent to levy the surcharge. 
Provision for sn rcharge was made under s. 8( 1) of 
the Finance Act, 1942 (Act XII of 1942). This sec-
tion may now be quoted:-
Section 8(1) "Subject to the provisions of sub-sec-
tions (2) and (3),-
(a) income-tax for the year beginning on the 1st 
day of April, 1942, shall be charged at the rates 
specified in Part I of Schedule II increased in the 
cases to which sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph A 
65 
x96x 
Abdullabhai 
1'.1. Bhagat 
v. 
The Income-tax 
Officer, Special 
Circle, Madras 
Abdutlabhai 
M. Bhagat 
v. 
The Incotne-tax

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