LexABBAS ALI versus STATE OF RAJASTHAN
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A ABBAS ALI v. ....... ST A TE OF RAJAS THAN FEBRUARY 15, 2007 B (DR. ARIJIT PASA YAT AND S.R KAPADIA, JJ.] Penal Code, 1860: -1 ss.299, 300, 302 and 304-1-Accused stabbed the deceased when he c was sleeping, resulting in his death-Conviction of accused under s.302- On facts and in the light of principles laid down in ss.299 and 300, conviction altered to s.304-l The prosecution case was that the body of deceased was found on a D Railway Overbridge. Recovery of knife was made on disclosure made by accused. Trial Court framed the charges against accused for offence punishable under s.302 IPC. Evidence of PW-9 was to the effect that in the night she and the deceased were sleeping under a neem tree by the side of ', the railway track. Suddenly the accused came there, stabbed the deceased and ...., forcibly took her to his jhuggi. She accepted that the distance was E considerable. She had lost her senses after seeing the accused stab the deceased. She accepted that the accused was physically disabled and normally moved iii a tricycle. She clarified that since deceased was sleeping he could not escape from the stab blow. Placing relia11ce on evidence of wife of deceased (PW-9), trial Court found accused guilty and convicted him. On appeal, High F Court upheld the conviction. The question for consideration before this Court is which is the )- . appropriate provision to be applied. Partly allowing the appeal, the Court G HELD: 1.1. Clause (b) of s.299 IPC corresponds with clauses (2) and (3) of s.300. The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under clause (2) is the knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the particular victim ,\. - being in such a peculiar condition or state of health that the internal harm caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that such harm H 714 I )., • ABBASALlv. STATEOFRAJASTHAN 715 would not in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient to cause death of a person A in normal health or condition. It is noteworthy that the 'intention to cause death' is not an essential requirement of clause (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender's knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the death of the particular victim, is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this clause. This aspect of B clause (2) is borne out by illustration (b) appended to s.300. !Para 11 J 1719-E, F] + 1.2. Clause (b) of s.299 does not postulate any such knowledge on the part of the offender. If the assailant had no knowledge about the disease or special frailty of the victim, nor an intention to cause death or bodily injury c sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence will not be murder, even if the injury which caused the death, was intentionally given. In clause (3) of s.300, instead of the words 'likely to cause death' occurring in the corresponding clause (b) of s.299, the words "sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death" have been used. Obviously, the distinction D lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine but real and if overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice. The difference )'- between clause (b) of s.299 and clause (3) of s.300 is one of the degree of probability of death resulting from .the intended bodily injury. The words "bodily injury ....... sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death" E mean that death will be the "most probable" result of the injury, having regard to the ordinary course of nature. For cases to fall within clause (3), it is not necessary that the offender intended to cause death, so long as the death ensues from the intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. [Para 12, 13] (719-G; 720-A, B, C, D] F ~--( Rajwani and Anr. v. State of Kera/a, AIR (1966) SC 1874 and Vits'! Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR (1958) SC 465, relied on. 1.3. Clause (c) ofS.299 and clause (4) ofs.300 both require knowledge of the probability of the act causing death. Clause (4) of s.300 would be G applicable where the knowledge of the offender as to the probability of death - of a person or persons in general as distinguished from a particular person J or persons being caused from his imminently dangerous act, approximates
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