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AA. HAJA MUNIUDDIN versus INDIAN RAILWAYS

Citation: [1992] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 72 · Decided: 17-11-1992 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: A.M. AHMADI · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

c , 
A 
AA. HAJA MUNIUDDIN 
v. 
INDIAN RAILWAYS 
NOVEMBER 17, 1992 
B 
[A.M. AHMADI AND M.M. PUNCHHI, JJ.] 
Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987-Section 16(2), and Rule 6 of the 
Railway Clainis Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1989-Claim petition-Fee-Ap-
plicability of Order XXXIII, CPC-Indigent person-Wliether can claim-
C · Claims Tribunal's power in regulating procedure. 
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-0rder XXXIII-lndigent person-
Whether can claim under the Railway Claims Tribunal Act. 1987.. 
The appellant dispatched marble slabs by rail under railway risk. 
D The marble slabs reached the destination in broken condition. 
, . 
The appellant moved a claim petition for Rs. 1,05,000 before the 
Railway (;)aims Tribunal established under the Railway Claims Tribunal 
Act, 1987. Under Section 16(2) of the Act r/w Rule 6 of the Railway ~laims 
Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1989, the appellant was required to pay a fee 
E 
of Rs. 2,055 on the claim application. The. appellant did not have the 
means to pay the requisite fee. He paid a fee of Rs. 150 on the application 
and prayed· that he be permitted to prosecute the claim as an indigent 
person. 
F 
. . . 
~ 
The Tribuna~ held. th~t Order XXXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure 
had no application to claims under the Act and rejected his prayer. 
Again~t the, order of the Tribunal, the present appeal by special leave 
was p~fe~red to thfs~ Co.urt. 
G 
On the question,' whether an indigent person who was not possessed 
of sufficient means to enable him to pay the fee prescribed under Section 
16(2) of .the Railway Claims Tribunal Act cc;mld be permitted to prefer his 
claim as an indigent person under Order XXXIII of the Code of Civil 
Procedure; allowing the appeal, this Court, 
H 
-HELD: l.L Nowher~ ·in the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 is 
' 
72 
AA HAJA MUNIUDDIN. v. INDIAN RAILWAYS 
73 
there any provision which runs counter to or is inconsistent with the A 
provisions of Order XXXIll of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Although 
the Act and the Rules do not specifically provide for the application of 
Order XXXlll of the Code, there is nothing in the Act or the Rules which 
precludes the Tribunal from following that procedure if the ends of justice 
so require. (78-GJ 
1.2. The Tribunal has the power to lay down its own procedure. 
Section 18(1) does not preclude it from invoking the provisions of Order 
XXXIII of the Code if the ends of justice so require. When an indigent 
person approaches the Tribunal for compensation for the wrong done to 
him, the Tribunal cannot refuse to exercise jurisdiction merely because he 
does not haH! the means to pay the fee. [79-H, 80-A] 
1.3. Access to justice cannot be denied to an individual merely 
because he does not have the means to pay the prescribed fee. Such a view 
would leave indigent persons without a remedy. [79-CJ 
1.4. The provisions of the Act and the Rules must be broadly inter-
preted to ensure access to justice. If a ·claimant is left without redress even 
if he has a valid claim against the railway administration merely because 
he is an indigent person, it would be a sad day and the poor will lose 
confidence in the system. [79-D] 
1.5. Section 18(1) only says that the Claims Tribunal 'shall not be 
bound' by the procedure laid down by the Code but does not g<> so far as 
to say that it 'shall be precluded' from invoking the provisions laid down 
by the Code even if the same are not inconsistent with the Act and the 
Rules. [79-EJ 
1.6. The Tribunal adopted a narrow interpretation of the relevant 
provisions of the Act in coming to (he conclusion that the Act as well as 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
the Rules did not permit invocation of Order XXXIII of the Code. The view 
taken by the Tribunal results in a person not having the means to pay the G 
fee prescribed for preferring a claim being left with<mt a remedy. Such a 
view would result in gross injustice. [79-G] 
1.7. In tae present case, the ends of justice require that the Tribunal 
should follow the procedure laid down in Order XXXIll of the Code to do 
justice for which it came to be established. (80-8] 
H 
74 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 
I\_ 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4865 of 
1992. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 8.8.1990 of the Madras High 
Court in C.R.P; No. 2064of1990 .• 
3 
Ms. Sandhya Ramachandra for the Appellant. 
Dr. Anand Prakash, Hemant Sharma, V.K. Verma and R Krishna 
Prasad for the Respondent. 
The Judgment of th

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