A. S. KRISHNAPPA CHETTIAR & ORS. versus NACHIAPPA CHETTIAR & ORS.

Citation: [1964] 2 S.C.R. 241 · Decided: 07-03-1963 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K. SUBBA RAO · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

2 S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
241 
A. S. KRISHN\\PPA CHETTIAR & ORS. 
v. 
NACHIAPPA CHETTIAR & ORS. 
(K. SuBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL and J. R. 
MUDHOLKAR jj) 
Limitation-Suspension of limitation in cases not covered 
by any specific provision of the Act, general . principles of-
Letter written by !lefendant to the trvstees-If acknowledgment 
of 
liability-Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (9 of 1908), 
SP. 
15 (1), 19. 
The plaintiff, Ramanathan Chettiar, obtained a decree 
in 0. S. N >. 45 of 1943 for the recovery of an amount due on 
promissory note against one Venkatachalam Chettiar and 
assigned the decree in favour of the appellant in C. A. !05 of 
1961, The exer.ution application filed by him proved infruc-
tuous because the first defendant was adjudicated an insolvent 
on February 27, 1945. On September 9, 1946 a composition 
of the debts due from the insolvent and his son, the second 
defendant, was arrived at. To the deed of composition the 
second defendant was also a party though he was not adjudi· 
cated an insolvent. 
Under that deed the creditors, including 
the four appellants in this case, agreed to take 40% of the dues. 
Under the composition arrangement, the entire property of the 
defendants, b,oth in India and in Burma was to vest in four 
trustees, one of whom was the insolvent that is, the first 
defendant to the suit. Two of the trustees were the present 
appellant in C. A. No. I 04 of 1961 and the fourth trustee was 
an outsider. The deed provided for the payment of the reduced 
amount by the trustees to different creditors from the income 
of the properties or by sale or mortgage of those properties 
within four years from April 14, 1947. The deed further 
provided for the extension of this time limit "according to 
exigencies and necessity at the discretion of the first two 
trustees" i. e., the first defendant and the appellant Chidamba-
ram Chettiar. 
The composition contemplated the realisation 
of the dues of the creditors frorr1 the income or sale or mortgage 
of the Burma property, in the first instance. "The composition 
scheme was accepted by the insolvency court and the adjudica• 
tion 
of the first defendant as insolvtnt was annulled by the 
court on December 19, 
1946. Out of the Burma assets very 
little was realised within the perio i of four years prescribed in 
the composition deed and the trustees did not extend the time. 
1963 
March 7 
1963 
.ol. S. K .. ,nn.ppa 
Cheuiar 
v • 
.Nochioppa ChtJliar 
242 
SUPREME COURT REP()RTS [1964] VOL. 
111c appellants, therefor., s011ght execution of their decree9 
against the Indian assets. 
The last execution application in 
0. S. Ko. 4G of 1943 was dismissed on September 19, 1946, 
and no petition was filed thc•caftcr till June 13, 1952. 
Simi-
larly in the other three appf'als execution 
applications were 
filed more than three years afrrr the disrnisc;al of the provious 
applications. 
In 
c.,ch of the execution applications, relier 
was claimed only against the second defendant. The Subordi-
nate Judge, heforc whom the cx~curion applications were filed, 
held that the adjustment precluded each of the appellants 
from executing his decree for a period of four yean; from 
April 14, 1917 and, thcrr:fore, the execution applications were 
within time. The High Court disagreed with the Subordinate 
Judge and hold in~ that the execution petitions were barred by 
time allowed the appeals. 
The main 
contcnlion of the 
appellants in thi• Court was that the principle underlying 
s. 15 (1) of the Limitation Act applied to the present case and 
at any rate the letter written hv the second defendant to the 
trustees opera!ed a• an 
acknowledgment of liability under 
s.19oftheLimitation Act. 
Held, that s. 15 (I) of the Lim ital ion Act is restricted 
In its application to a case \vhcre the execution of a decree 
has been stayed hy an injunction or an order. ~frie Limitation 
Act is a piece of arljective 
or 
procedura] law and not of 
substantive law. 
RuJcs 
of Proccdtue cannot be extended by 
analogy or reference to procer.dings to y,·hich they do not expre-
ssly apply or could be said to apply by nec.,sary implication. 
Suspension 
of Limitation 
in 
circumstances of the kind 
obtaining in these apreals is neither txplicit nor in1plicit in 
s. 15 upon which reliance is placed by the appellants. 
Gorind J.Vail· Gurunrtlhnaik v. 
Brv!lawan11awa Parutap'fXl, 
T. L.R. 19·11 
Born. 435, Pu/in Chamlm Sen v. Amin Mia 
Mu,affar Ahmad, A. l.R.1933 Cal. 508

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