A.N. ROY, COMMISSIONER OF POLICE AND ANR. versus SURESH SHAM SINGH

Citation: [2006] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 165 · Decided: 04-07-2006 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: H.K. SEMA · Disposal: Case Partly allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

A.N. ROY, COMMISSIONER OF POLICE AND ANR. 
V. 
SURESH SHAM SINGH 
JULY 4, 2006 
[H.K. SEMA AND A.K. MATHUR, JJ.] 
Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956-Sections 18 and 20-Prevention 
of immoral traffic-Dispute regarding power of State Government to confer 
A 
B 
on Police Commissioner of a metropolitan area the powers of District C 
Magistrate for purposes of ss. 18 and 20-Held: Person appointed as Executive 
Magistrate can only be appointed as Additional District Magistrate or District 
Magistrate-State Government directed to first appoint the Police Commissioner 
as Executive Magistrate and then further appoint him as Additional District 
Magistrate having powers of the District Magistrate for purposes of ss. 18 and 
20-Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Section 20. 
D 
Interpretation of Statutes-Literal construction-Plain meaning-Held: 
Courts not to enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when language of 
the statute is plain and unambiguous. 
With a view to check the alarming rise in trafficking of minor girls E 
and women in the Metropolitan city of Bombay, the State of Maharashtra 
in exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (5) read with sub-sections 
(1) and (2) of Section 20 CrPC, issued a Notification in 1999 conferring 
on the Police Commissioner of the metropolitan area of Brihan Bombay, 
the powers of District Magistrate for the purposes of Sections 18 and 20 
of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956. Pursuant thereto, the Police F 
Commissioner conducted raids and ordered eviction or closure of brothels. 
On 28-06-2004, an eviction order was passed against the Respondent who 
filed writ petition challenging the same. High Court set aside the said 
eviction order holding that the Notification was ab initio bad in law and 
did not empower the Police Commissioner to assume the jurisdiction of G 
District Magistrate for the purposes of Sections 18 and 20 of the 1956 Act. 
Hence the present appeals. 
Partly allowing the appeals, the Court 
HELD: 1.1. Sub-section (1) of Section 20 CrPC deals with the power 
1~ 
H 
166 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 
A of the State Government to appoint Executive Magistrates "as many 
persons" as it thinks fit in every district and in every metropolitan area. 
Sub-section (2) of Section 20 deals with the power of the State Government 
to appoint any Executive Magistrate to be an Additional District 
Magistrate and such Magistrate shall have the powers of a District 
B Magistrate under the CrPC or under any other law for the time being in 
force as may be directed by the State Government. Thus, unless a person 
is appointed as an Executive Ma1:istrate he cannot be appointed as either 
an Additional District Magistrat1e or the District Magistrate. 
(173-H; 174-A, BJ 
C 
1.2. The words, "as many persons" employed in sub-section (I) are 
adequately elastic to include the Commissioner of Police. In other words, 
the State Government is not precluded from appointing the Commissioner 
of Police in metropolitan area as an Executive Magistrate. Once the 
Commissioner of Police is appointed as an Executive Magistrate in the 
metropolitan area of Brihan Bombay, he can be appointed as an Additional 
D District Magistrate, who shall have the powers of the District Magistrate 
for the purposes of Sections 18 and! 20 of the 1956 Act. This view is further 
clarified by sub-section (5) of Section 20 when it is stated that nothing in 
this section shall preclude the State Government from conferring under 
any law for the time being in force, on Commissioner of Police, all or any 
E of the powers of an Executive Magistrate in relation to a metropolitan 
area. (174-D, E] 
2. It is now well settled principle of law that the Court cannot enlarge 
the scope of legislation or intention when the language of the statute is 
plain and unambiguous. Narrow and pedantic construction may not always 
p be given effect to. Courts should avoid a construction, which would reduce 
the legislation to futility. It is also well settled that every statute is to be 
interpreted without any violence to its language. It is also trite that when 
an expression is capable of more than one meaning, the Court would 
attempt to resolve the ambiguity in a manner consistent with the purpose 
of the provision, having regard to the great consequences of the alternative 
G constructions. (174-F, GI 
Anwar Hasan Khan v. Mohd. Shafi and Ors., (2001 [ 8 SCC 540, 
referred to. 
3. Reading sub-sections (1)

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.