A.M. MATHUR versus PRAMOD KUMAR GUPTA

Citation: [1990] 2 S.C.R. 110 · Decided: 22-03-1990 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 4 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
A.M. MATHUR 
v. 
PRAMOD KUMAR GUPTA 
MARCH 22, 1990 
B 
[K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY AND R.M. SAHA!, JJ.] 
c 
Practice and Procedure: Judicial restraint-Need for-High 
Court Judge making derogatory remarks criticising counsel, parties or 
witnesses-Such remark not to be made unless absolutely necessary for 
deciding the case. 
While allowing a writ petition, one of the Judges delivered the 
main Judgment invalidating the decision of the Government on the 
ground that it violated Article 14 of the Constitution. The other Judge 
delivered a separate, but concurring opinion which contained highly 
disparaging remarks attributing ma/a fides and underhand dealing on 
D the part of the State Government. Several appeals were filed against the 
said decision before this Court. This Court. allowed the appeals and 
observed that the strictures passed in the concurring Judgment were 
totally unjustified and unwarranted. State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal 
& Ors., [1987] 1 SCR I. 
E 
Thereafter an Advocate who had no connection whatsoever with 
the litigation filed a review petition before the High Court. It was 
alleged that the State Government committed fraud and procu~ed the 
judgment from this Court. The matter was listed before a Division 
Bench on 29th October 1988, and one of the Judges dismissed the 
review petition as not maintainable. Meanwhile, another application 
F 
for review was filed stating that the Vidhan Sabha proceedings would 
lend credence to the claim that the State Government had practised 
fraud on the Court. On 6th February, 1989 the other Judge,(who had 
passed strictures against the Government in the Writ Petition) dismis-
sed the review position, for want of jurisdiction, with an observation 
that had the appellant acted bona fide in briefing the then Chief Minis-
G ter, the fraud on the Court, as also the misleading press statement by 
the then Chief Minister, would have been avoided. It was further 
observed that the appellant did not act befitting the status of the high 
office of the Advocate General and that he did not have the courage to 
face the situation in the Court later. 
H 
Before this Court the appellant contended that he had no 
110 
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A.M. MATHUR v. P.K. GUPT'\ 
111 
opportunity to meet the allegations in the review petitions. He had also 
A 
contended that earlier he entered appearance as Advocate General on 
... 
behalf of the State, and that when the review petitions were heard 
neither he was the Advocate General nor did he wish to enter appearance 
since he thought that the review petitions deserved to be dismissed as 
; 
there were no valid grounds. 
B 
Allowing the appeal, this Court, 
,-
HELD: I. Judicial restraint and discipline are as necessary to the 
orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of the 
army. The duty of restraint, this humility of function should be a con-
slant theme of our judges. This quality in decision making is as much 
(, 
necessary for judges to command respect as to protect the independence 
of the judiciary. Judicial restraint in this regard might better be called 
judicial respect; that is, respect by the judiciary. Respect to those who 
.::.., 
come before the Court as well to other co-ordinate branches of the 
State, the Executive and the Legislauture. There must be mutual 
respect. When these qualities fail or when litigants and public believe 
D 
that the judge has failed in these qualities, it will be neither good for the 
judge nor for the judicial process. Ill 7C-E] 
2. The Judges Bench is a seat of power. Not only do judges have 
power to make binding decisions, their decisions legitimate the use of 
., 
power by other officials. The Judges have the absolute and unchalleng-
E 
eable control of the Court domain. But they cannot misuse their auth-
ority by intemperate comments, undignified banter or scathing criti-
cism of cousel, parties or witnesses. The Court has the inherent power 
to act freely upon its own conviction on any matter coming before it 
" 
for adjudication but it is a general principle of the highest importance to 
the proper administration of justice that derogatory remarks ought not 
F 
to be made against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into 
consideration unless it is absolutely necessary for the decision of the 
case to animadvert on their conduct. l l 17F-G J 
R.K. Lakshmanan v. A.K. Srinivamn, [1976] I SCR 204 and 
Niranjan Patnaik v. Sashibhushan Kar, [1986] 2 SCC 567, relied on. 
G 

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