A. M. MAIR & CO. versus GORDHANDASS SAGARMULL.

Citation: [1950] 1 S.C.R. 792 · Decided: 30-11-1950 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: M. PATANJALI SASTRI · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

792 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1950] 
1950 
set aside. As the High Court, however, has dismissed 
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the suit only on the ground of non-attestation of the 
Sarju Pmhad mortgage bond and did not consider the other points 
;;ja 
which were raised before it, the case must go. back to 
Jwaleshw>ri that court m order that the other matters, which have 
Prntap Narain been left undecided, may be heard and decided by the 
Singh & Others. learned Judges and the case disposed of in accordance 
with law. The plaintiff appellant is entitled to costs of 
~fakherjea J. this hearing as well as the costs of the High Court 
1950 
Nov. 30. 
against defendant No. 1. 
Appeal allowed. 
Agent for the appellant: Rajindar Narain. 
Agent for the respondents: 5. P. Varma. 
A. M. MAIR & CO. 
v. 
GORDHANDASS SAGARMULL. 
[SAIYID FAZL Au, PATANJALI SASTRI and 
MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN JJ.] 
Arbitration-Contract by 
bro~er for sale of goods by "sold" 
and "bought" notes-Arbitration clause-Seller denying right of 
b•roker to enforce arbitral ,;nn 
clause-~J urisdiction of arbitrators-
Valid,ity of award-Construction of contract. 
The appellants, a firm of brokers, entered into a' contract for 
the sale and purchase of a quantity of jute under a ''sold note" 
addressed to the respondents which they signed as " A & Co., 
brokers" and a "bought note" of the same date and for the 
same quantity of jute addressed to a third person in which also 
they signed as '
1 A & Co., brokers". 
The" sold note" contained 
the usual arbitration clause under which '' all matters, questions, 
disputes, differences and/.or. cla.ims, arising out of and/or con-
cerning, and/or in connection and/or in consequence of, or relating 
to, the contract ......... shall be referred to the arbitration of the 
Bengal Chamber of Commerce." 
A dispute having arisen with 
regard to a matter wbich admittedly arose out of the contract 
evidenced by the sold note, the appellants referred the dispute 
for arbitration. 
The respondents raised before the arbitrators 
the further contention that as the appellants were only brokers 
they were not entitled to refer the matter to arbitration. 
The 
arbitrators made an award in favour of the appellants. 
The 
respondents wade an application to the High Court under the 
Indian Arbitration Act for setting aside the award: 
Held that,. assuming that it was open to the respondents to 
raise this objection at that stage, inasmuch as this further dispute 
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S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
793 
was also one which turned on the true interpretation of the 
1950 
contraet a.nd the reSpondents must have recourse to the contract 
to estJ.blish their claim, this was also a dispute arising out of or .4, M. Mair & Co. 
concerning the contract and as such fell within the arbitration 
v. 
clause, and the award could not be set a.side under the Indian Gordhandass 
Arbitration Act, 1.940, on the ground that it was beyond iuris-
Sagarmull. 
diction and void. 
Heyman v. Darwins Ltd. ([1942] A.O. 356)referred to. 
APPELL.ATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. XLII 
of 1950. 
Appeal from the judgment of the Calcutta H!gh 
Court (Harries C.J. and Chakravarthi J.) in Appeal 
from Original Order No. 78 of 1948. 
, · 
N. C. Chatterjee (B. Sen, with him), 
for the 
appellants. 
A. N. Grover, for the respondents. 
1950. November 30. The judgment of Faz! Ali and 
Patanjali Sastri JJ. was delivered by 
F .AZ'L ALI J .-This is an appeal from a judgment of a 
E'azl Ali J. 
Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta in 
West Bengal, reversing the decision of a single Judge of 
that Court, who had refused to set aside an award given 
by the arbitration tribunal of the Bengal Chamber of 
Commerce on a submission made by the respondents. 
The facts of the case are as follows. 
On the 25th January, 1946, the appellants entered 
into a contract with the respondents for the sale of 
5,000 maunds of jute, which was evidenced by a "sold 
note" (Exhibit A), which is in the form of a letter 
addressed to the respondents, commencing with these 
words: "We have this day sold by your order and 
for your account to the undersigned, etc." The word 
"undersigned " admittedly refers to the appellants, 
and, at the end of the contract, below their signature, 
the word "brokers" is written. On the same day, a 
"bought note" (Exhibit B) was addressed by the 
appellants to the Bengal Jute Mill Company, with the 
following statement: "We have this day bought by 
your ortler and for your account from the 

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